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ABSTRACT
Drinking water systems in the United States confront several challenges such as aging
infrastructure, polluted source water, and fragmented systems. The burdens, however, are not
equally distributed across the nation. Disadvantaged communities such as communities of color
are disproportionately affected by drinking water-related problems.
This study focuses on drinking water quality violations and slow enforcement actions of
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) during 2016 to 2018. The EPA’s Safe Drinking Water
Information System (SDWIS) was used to obtain violation records and characteristics of
community water systems. The data set in this study contains 21,845 community water systems.
Based on the political-economic perspective, it examines three main hypotheses: 1) whether
SDWA violations are distributed randomly across geographic locations; 2) whether compositions
of a community including race/ethnicity, poverty, and civic engagement are related to the
exposure to contaminated drinking water; 3) and whether these factors are also associated with
unequal enforcement of drinking water quality regulations.
The main findings are indicated: first, SDWA violations are concentrated in California’s
Central Valley, the Texas colonias and rural South; second, water systems serving communities
with a larger proportion of Hispanic residents tend to have a higher frequency of SDWA
violations; third, while the average length of water system’s noncompliance appears longer in
communities with higher proportion of Black and Hispanic residents, out-of-compliance water
systems return to comply the standard quickly as communities have a higher capacity of civic
engagement. The empirical findings in this study strengthens the environmental justice demand
that US drinking water policies should be reformed at structural level for all, free from
v

discrimination, bias, or inequality. It also contributes to the importance of infrastructure
reparations that particularly focuses on disadvantaged communities that were historically shaped
by segregation.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Drinking Water Injustice and Green Criminology
Water is important to human life. Free flowing water, as a life-sustaining resource, has
been controlled and managed in order to improve the efficiency of water service to people
(Contorno, Sarango and Harlan, 2018). What we drink has been increasingly valued as a
commodity. Restricted access to clean water can create lucrative profits for those who have and
control water resources. The human utilization of natural systems has resulted in water problems
throughout the world (Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018).
It is widely assumed that the United States has safe and affordable drinking water service
available to all residents as well as one of the most advanced water supply systems in the world
(Brisman, McClanaha, South and Waters, 2018). The United Nations estimates that all urban
populations in the United States have access to safe water or sanitation. The benefits of those
systems, however, have not been equally distributed across communities or populations
(Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018; Cooley, 2012; Siegel, 2019). Clean water is commodified
and only accessible to those who can afford it. While the United States has good water quality
overall, small communities and low-income communities of color are exposed to water problems
for drinking and household use (Vanderwarker, 2012).
One example is the drinking water crisis in Flint, Michigan. The Flint water crisis
exposed as many as 98,000 residents to harmful containments, including elevated levels of lead,
disinfection byproducts (DBPs), and harmful bacteria, which has severe detrimental impact on
1

public health (Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2017). The Flint Water Advisory Task Force published its
finding that the water problem was caused by multiple factors such as mismanagement of water
systems, insufficient community finances, regulatory failure of government institutions, and
disregard for residents’ complaints and concerns about their water quality (Davis et al., 2016).
The conclusion was that “the Flint water crisis is a case of environmental injustice.” The
Michigan Civil Rights Commission’s report also concluded that “deeply embedded institutional,
systematic and historical racism” was indirectly responsible for the Flint water crisis. That is, the
majority-Black community has suffered multiple disadvantages such as, 1) absence of a good tax
base, 2) decades of disinvestment and 3) lack of political power, and became exposed to the
environmental harm posed by contaminated drinking water.
As the Flint water crisis illustrated, the scope and nature of the water-related problems
(e.g., inadequate water quality and institutional/regulatory failure of response) is complex,
especially in poor and minority communities (Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018). According
to the Urban Water Innovation Network’s report (UWIN)1, political-economic forces have
resulted in the current condition of drinking water systems and management in the water
industry. Based on interviews with 45 leaders of community organizations from national NGOs
to state government officials, the report identified three main reasons of water inequalities and
barriers to sustainability: 1) racial discrimination, 2) economics of free market logic, and 3)
exclusive institutions and regulatory failure (Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018).
As far as the root cause of water inequality is specifically concerned, the current
consequence of unequal distribution of basic water services and amenities, at first, resulted from

1

UWIN is a coalition of academic institution and key partners across the U.S that collaborate on research,
engagement, and educational programs to solve problems of urban water systems (Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan,
2018).
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decades of racialized urban planning. Wealthy and white communities continue to take
advantage of investments from both the public and private sector while poor and minority
communities have historically suffered divestment. The unequal distribution of power and
resources in geographic space produces unequal infrastructure development such as inferior
water infrastructure. The legacy of racial segregation practices such as redlining and restrictive
covenants also led minorities to live in concentration of adverse community conditions such as
proximity to polluting facilities (Lynch, 2016). Residents living in disadvantaged communities
are also exposed to pollution from industrial facilities that worsen local water quality.
In addition, the process of commodification and privatization of drinking water
intensifies water injustice. Restricted quantities of fresh and clean water are marketable and
lucrative to corporations and private developers. Good quality water is commodified and sold to
those who can afford it (White, 2003). Higher cost of water services that is needed for water
infrastructure repairment and efficient technologies replacement leads to water affordability
issues. Those who cannot pay for water service are exposed to the threat of water shutoffs. The
rising cost of drinking water disproportionately affect low-income communities (Mack and
Wrase, 2017). The free market logic with lack of a safety net is another cause of unequal
distribution of clean water.
Exclusive institutions and regulatory failure of water and environmental agencies also
contribute to water injustice. The rigidity and bureaucratic culture of these agencies often fail to
consider marginalized populations’ complaints and concern. Whether it is intentional or not, poor
communities, and communities of color have less of a voice when it comes to important
decision-making process (Vanderwarker, 2012). Wealthier communities have more political
power, and influence water policy and planning processes. In addition, contributing to water
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injustice, long-term noncompliance and weak enforcement of drinking water violation are more
likely to occur in poor and minority communities (NRDC, 2019).
The adverse consequences of drinking water problems have contributed to a growing
body of environmental justice (EJ) research. Based on the assumption of environmental justice
that every community has an equal right to be free from environmental harms, EJ studies tend to
demonstrate patterns of “differential victimization,” - especially African American, Hispanic,
and poor communities - that are related with exposure to risky commercial/industrial operations,
air pollution, and chemical accidents (Cole and Foster, 2001; Lynch, Long, Stretesky. and
Barrett, 2017; Taylor 2014; White, 2010). Research on EJ and drinking water contamination also
demonstrates that low-income communities and minority communities are more affected by
drinking water violations than other populations (Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2017; McDonald and
Jones, 2018; Switzer and Teodoro, 2017). These findings emphasize the local and national
inequality of drinking water access and require an EJ effort to remove threats to water service
and management. EJ issue around drinking water, thus, demands water policy reformations for
all, free from discrimination, bias or inequality (Vanderwarker, 2012).
Even though past analyses have found the relationships between drinking water
contamination and EJ indicators, these findings do not provide a complete picture of drinking
water problems. For example, several studies have been limited in terms of spatial scope. These
studies focus on single state (e.g., Arizona) or on sections of states (e.g., California’s Central
Valley).
In order to fill the gap in the literature, Alluire, Wu and Lall (2017) have conducted a
national assessment on drinking water quality violations for several decades. This study
indicated that there are hot spots (e.g., rural areas) of water contamination and vulnerability
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factors (e.g., small water systems) associated with the water system violations. The findings
emphasized financial assistance and technological skills as the solutions to the problems in
community water systems. One of the limitations of that study, however, is that it did not focus
on the water related problems connected to a broader range of political-economic forces, even
though problems in local water systems are recognized as a complex phenomenon under social,
racial and EJ issues (Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018). Alluire, Wu and Lall’s study was the
first investigation of national assessment for drinking water injustice over three decades, but it
did not focus on the origins of water inequities as well as the importance of addressing drinking
related problems at a structural level.
Currently, Natural Resources Defense Council’s (NRDC) report examined the correlation
between sociodemographic factors and compliance with and enforcement of the safe drinking
water act nationwide (Fedinick, Taylor, and Robert, 2019). Even though this study represented
the first analysis on the association between EJ indicators (e.g., race, ethnicity, immigrants) and
inadequate enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) at the national scale, and
demonstrated the positive association using Pearson correlations analysis, the results did not
isolate the association between enforcement actions and specific utility characteristics.
The issues reviewed above related to drinking water access as a social and environmental
justice concern deserves more attention in green criminology for several reasons. First, even
though green criminology has dealt with a broad range of environments (e.g., land, air) and
environmental issues (e.g., mining, timber harvests) (Lynch et al., 2018; White, 2003), it has not
drawn sufficient attention to drinking water related problems2. That is, green criminology

Currently, there is one book published in 2018, “Water, Crime, and Security in the Twenty-first Century: Too
Dirty, Too Little, Too Much”, which discusses water crime, harm and security with the criminological perspective
(Brisman et al., 2018).
2
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researchers have not given serious attention to drinking water regulation violations as green
crime and injustice (Brisman et al., 2018). Second, investigation on environmental issues, within
the green criminological perspective, demands an appreciation of how green harm is socially and
historically constructed (Lynch et al., 2018; Lynch, 2016; White, 2003). Based on the
framework, it requires understanding of how drinking water inequities are shaped by broader
factors of social, political, and economic justice, which are left empirically unaddressed.
Drinking water problems need to be discussed in diverse contexts. Third, drinking water
contaminations as environmental harm also deserves attention because they often have more
victims and produce more damage than street crimes (Lynch, Michalowski, and Groves, 2006).
As seen from the Flint water crisis, drinking water contaminations may pose an acute health
threat to public health such as low birth weight, cancer, or nervous system problems (Allaire et
al, 2017). Considering these adverse outcomes, this study provides new insight into drinking
water injustice by examining drinking water regulation violations and incompliance to the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) linked with community characteristics at the county level across
the nation.

The Present Study
Communities that are already socially and politically disempowered are exposed to
drinking water related problems today. Clean water access restrictions and pollution violate
human rights and social equality – that is, safe and clean drinking water must be accessible and
affordable for all of residents, regardless of race, ethnicity, and class (White, 2008). Drinking
water injustice deserves an attention to be theoretically and empirically discussed in green
criminology.
6

This study assesses drinking water quality violations and the enforcement of the SDWA
within the political-economic context. The EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Information System
(SDWIS) for 2016-2018 was used to obtain violation records and characteristics of community
water systems. The SDWA was enacted in 1974 to authorize the EPA to regulate drinking water
quality. The EPA sets national health standard to protect drinking water at the federal level.
States are primarily responsible for regulating public water systems to meet adherence with the
standards. When the water systems fail to ensure an EPA-set drinking water standard, drinking
water violation can be reported. The EPA regularly collected data on drinking water violations
and publicly provide the information through the SDWIS.

Figure 1. Public Water Systems in the United States.
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.3

3

For public water systems, see https://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/drinking/public/index.html#one.
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The number of public water system in the US is approximately 155,693. Of the public
water system, 52,100 (33.5%) are community water systems and 103,583 (66.5%) are noncommunity systems, including transient systems and non-transient systems (EPA, 2008).
This study focuses on violations of the SDWA committed by a community water system
in the community context. Community water systems, as a kind of public water systems, serve at
least 15 service networks or 25 or more customers, and are subject to the regulatory standards of
the SDWA. Reportedly, 96% of the US population are served by community water systems
(VanDerslice, 2011). In this study, violations and characteristics of community water systems
that serve over 500 people were collected from the SDWIS between 2016 and 2018, because
very small systems (serving fewer than 500 people) are more likely to report violations of the
SDWA inadequately (Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2017; Rubin, 2013). The data set in this study
contains 21,845 community water systems.
SDWA violations are primarily self-reported. Under the SDWA, community drinking
water systems are required to submit basic information (e.g., ID number, county served, number
of people served, and sources of water) and violation information (e.g., compliance with
mandated treatment techniques or violations of any maximum containment levels) to primary
agencies4. Primary agencies are required to collect the information on water systems, reporting
them to EPA regularly. The information submitted by primary agencies to EPA includes
enforcement results that water systems return to comply regulations, if they are out of
compliance. Based on the self-reported information on water systems, EPA manages and
evaluates state drinking water policies and regulations. The reported data are updated and
checked for accuracy every quarter during a verification period. Quarterly and annual reports are

See the detail information about the Safe Drinking Water Information System at EPA’s website:
https://echo.epa.gov/help/sdwa-faqs.
4
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available at the Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS) federal report search
website5.
This study used the self-reported SDWA violation data including 1) health-based
drinking water violation, and 2) length of time out of compliance from 2016 to 2018, which was
downloaded 2019 quarter 1 dataset of the SDWIS. Characteristics of community water systems
are included: sizes (service customers), type of source water (groundwater or surface water),
ownership type and service location.
SDWIS also provides county-level locations served by each community water system.
Since the demographics information about customers of a community water system is not
publicly available, counties served by each system can be matched with the geographic names in
the U.S Census Bureau American Community Survey to find possible association between
drinking water violations and community characteristics. That is, US Census demographic data
for a county are linked to the violation data from community water systems serving the region.
This study examines how three dimensions of community characteristics - 1) racial/ethnic
proportion, 2) poverty, 3) civic engagement - are hypothesized to be associated with drinking
water system’s violations and length of time out of compliance of the SDWA. By doing so, this
current study makes three contributions to the previous studies as indicated below.
First, consistent with the previous literature (Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018;
Schaider et al., 2019; Vanderwarker, 2012), it is expected that community water systems serving
minorities communities are more likely to commit violations of the SDWA and to have longer
length of time out of compliance than those serving white communities. That means that
communities of color are more likely be exposed to the drinking water violation and slow

See EPA, “Safe Drinking Water Information System Federal Reporting Services,” https://www.epa.gov/groundwater-and-drinking-water/safe-drinking-water-information-system-sdwis-federal-reporting.
5
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enforcement of the SDWA than white communities. Decades of racialized urban planning (e.g.,
land-use planning, housing) contributed to unequal distribution of water infrastructure (e.g.,
water piped systems) that exist across communities currently. In addition, minorities
communities may have less political power and may be marginalized from budgetary decisionmaking processes, and therefore the minorities community’s water systems may have fewer
resources to keep new treatment technology in response to the drinking water contamination.
Given the reason, the water systems serving communities of color will also face slower and
insufficient compliance of SDWA than white communities.
Second, along with racial discrimination in zoning and urban construction, this study
analyzes the logic of economics that are hypothesized to lead to drinking water injustice. That is,
community water systems serving poor communities are more likely to commit drinking water
violations than those for wealthy communities because water distribution systems are
constructed at a local level, but access to water financing (e.g., in the form of loans and grants for
infrastructure construction to maintain the system) is often hard to obtain for low-income
community water systems characterized by absence of tax bases and lower relative household
incomes (Copeland, 2010). In that system, wealthier communities are prioritized for
infrastructure improvements, where there is an expected return on investment. Given the
inequitable distribution of fund for water systems, lower income communities are associated
with higher number of drinking water violations and longer length of time out of compliance of
the SDWA.
Lastly, this study explores the hypothesis that civic engagement is independently
associated with drinking water violations and slow enforcement of the SDWA. Environmental
justice literature indicates that civically organized communities are more likely to have political

10

mobilization to solve environmental issues (Hamilton, 1993; 1995). As such, communities
reflecting more civic participation have more political influence over decision-making process of
local water management agencies to fix its related problems.
The political power of community generally depends on compositions of residents’
socioeconomic status because people of color and low-income communities have less resources
such as knowledge, time, money to access local policy makers and managers (Core and Foster,
2001; Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp, 2001). Prior researchers tend to use demographic measures as
proxies of civic political weakness including high proportion of minority and low income (Pastor
et al, 2001). Thus, poor communities of color are more exposed to high proportion of
environmental hazards than white and wealthy communities, because race and poverty are often
highly correlated with the limited capacity of collective civic participation and least resistance
(Bullard, 1996; Hamilton, 1993; Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp, 2001; Pellow, 2004).
While residential compositions are largely associated with political capacity, one cannot
assume demographic factors alone determines organizational capacity and political weakness of
a community (Zahran, Hastings, and Brody, 2008). Even poor and minority communities can
mobilize their members into collective action aimed at resolving environmental issues.
Mobilizing resource in communities relies on civic vitality, which is partially independent of
community demographic indicators (Zahran, Hastings and Brody, 2008:184).
Given this background, a community with greater level of collective civic engagement is
more likely to have effective reactions to the quality of governance and the sense of
responsibility of water utilities and local governments. Residents’ political activity may foster
environmental pressure on water systems to meet the regulations and provide healthier drinking
water to local people. In other words, communities with the least amount of collective civic
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engagement are also more likely to fail in adequate enforcement for the regulations. Prior
research has rarely considered the possibility that geographies of civic engagement have an
important implication for community drinking water quality. It is expected that regulatory failure
of drinking water system is associated with civic engagement of communities, even when racial
composition and/or economic status are considered.

Overview of Chapters
This current study is organized as follows. Chapter two introduces the current challenges
of drinking water in the United States. Specifically, it includes several considerable problems
drinking water systems across the nation has faced, such as 1) aging water-related infrastructure,
2) unregulated contaminants in drinking water, 3) fragmented water system, and 4) bureaucratic
culture of water manager and government agencies.
Chapter three provides the knowledge of drinking water injustice. Based on the politicaleconomic framework and environmental justice perspective based on the green criminological
scholarship, the problems related to drinking water are explored with three dimensions: 1)
racialized urban planning, 2) profit-oriented policies and regulations, and 3) exclusiveness of
decision-making process in the water governance and importance of civic engagement.
After the review of previous literature, chapter four provides the research hypotheses,
methods, and measures. This chapter also provides information of the data collection procedure,
sample of this study, and limitations of this study.
Chapter five describes the analyses, the results, and their implications. In this section, the
analytic procedures for the data, descriptive information and results of hypotheses are provided.

12

The final chapter discusses the findings from this study relative to previous studies. It
also provides implications for policy and suggests for future study.

13

CHAPTER TWO:
DRINKING WATER IN THE UNITED STATES

Trends in National Water Use
Water is generally available in both stocks and flows. Stocks of water contain
groundwater, lakes, soil moisture, small volumes in rivers. Flows of water contain rainfall,
streamflow, and evaporation and are estimated in water amounts per unit time (Gleick, 2012).
According to the 2017 US Geological Survey (USGS), water is used in the United States for
eight purposes in general: public supply, self-supplied domestic, irrigation, livestock,
aquaculture, industrial, mining, and thermoelectric power. Most of water, which accounts 90% of
the national total, are used by irrigated agriculture, thermoelectric power, and public supply
(USGS, 2017).
Water use in the United States greatly increased since the 1950s due to growing
populations and expanding economic and industrial activities. Since then, increasing demands
for water put more pressures on the nation’s water systems to secure diversion and manipulation
of surface water resources and withdrawals of groundwater resources. The rising water demand
resulted in a massive investment in water related infrastructure such as dams, irrigation systems,
municipal water purification and wastewater collection and treatment systems (Gleick, 2012).
This trend, however, changed in the 1980s. Water use in the nation roughly doubled between
1950 and 1980 but then began to decrease, despite increasing population and economic growth.
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Average water uses in 1980 peaked at about 370 billion gallons per day. Current use in 2015 is
approximately 280 billion gallons per day.
There are several factors that have contributed to the decline in water use over 25 years,
including efficiency improvements in water use, federal regulations on wastewater discharge
(e.g., the Clean Water Act), and the transition from a water-intensive manufacturing economy to
a less water-intensive service economy (Gleick, 2012: p.11; USGS, 2017).

Figure 2. Trends in Population and Freshwater Withdrawals by Source, 1950-2105.
Source: Pacific Institute analysis, from USGS, 2017.

Given the trends in freshwater availability in the United States, the nation has not
suffered from absolute scarcity of water resources. Despite the plentiful water resources, the
United States has confronted several problems associated with the inequitable distribution of
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water resources across different regions, unhealthy drinking water quality, and disputes over
drinking water management and policies (Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018; Gleick, 2012).

Water Pollution in the United States
There are sources of water – for example, rivers, streams, lakes, springs, and ground water
- that offer water to public drinking water supplies and private wells. Since drinking water utilities
must meet the requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Acts, protecting sources of water from
contamination helps save treatment costs and may avoid or defer the need for complex treatment.
Source water protection can also bring benefits to protecting water quality for wildlife and
recreational use, and maintaining the availability and volume of water supplies (EPA, 2020) 6.
Even though there are many source water protection programs, a variety of activities (e.g.,
disposal of agricultural, urban, and industrial effluents into water bodies) can contaminate drinking
water or diminish freshwater resources, which may cause chronic health effects and harm the
ecosystem (EPA, 2004; White, 2003).
Water pollution is generally characterized as originating from point-source pollution and
nonpoint-source pollution. Point-source pollution is caused by direct discharges into waterways
through plant pipes, sewers, or other discernible outlets. Nonpoint-source pollution comes from
land runoff, atmospheric deposition, drainage, or hydrogenic modification. That is, common types
of nonpoint-source pollution include runoff of excess fertilizer and pesticides from agricultural

6

There are examples of source water protection - riparian zone restoration to reduce runoff pollution; stream bank
stabilization to reduce sedimentation; land protection/easements; developing emergency response plans; Educating
industry, business, and citizens on pollution prevention and source water protection (EPA website:
https://www.epa.gov/sourcewaterprotection/basic-information-about-source-water-protection, 2020)
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land or residential areas, oil and toxic chemicals from urban runoff and energy production, and
sediment from eroding streambanks (EPA, 2020).

Point Source of Water Pollution
Wastewater discharges from facilities may contain contaminants at levels that affect the
quality of water. In order to prevent point-source of water pollution (i.e., direct discharge of
contaminant into waterways from an identifiable or specific source), the Clean Water Act (CWA)7
created the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) in 1972. The NPDES
requires facilities (e.g., wastewater treatment plants or factories) that discharge wastewater into
waterways to obtain a permit and to comply with the restrictions and monitoring requirements
regarding the amounts and types of contaminants that can be released (Allen, 2012).
Despite the regulation that was originally designed to help achieve a zero discharge goal8,
large quantities of pollutants, however, are discharged from the facilities into water bodies. For
example, EPA (2004) reported that over 850 billion gallons of untreated sewage from domestic,
industrial and commercial pollution, and sewage overflow are emitted into waterways annually. A
recent study indicated that around 200 billion pounds of contaminants from state
owned/concentrated publicly owned treatment work (POTWs) were also discharged into water
bodies in 2014 (Lynch, Stretesky, and Long, 2017). POTWs receive various sources of mercury
from hospitals and laboratories, and release considerable quantities of mercury pollution into
harbor (Cerreno, Panero, and Boehme. 2002).

7

The Clean Water Act (CWA) that was the amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 is the
law protecting surface water quality in the United States. This act is to achieve the purpose of “restoring and
maintaining the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” (Allen, 2012: 112).
8
The CWA indicates that “it is the national policy that a major research and demonstration effort be made to
develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters, wasters of the
contiguous zone, and oceans.” (33 U.S.C. §1251(a)).
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Weak enforcement of CWA regulations and outdated limitation guideline for wastewater
treatment facilities contribute to the failure to address the water quality problems (Allen, 2012).
According to a report, more than half (around 57%) of 7,000 major permitted facilities across the
nation did not keep their permit limits in 2005. Additionally, since minor facilities are inspected
far less often than the major facilities, the violations of NPDES permit will be higher than that of
major facilities (Andreen and Jones, 2008). Considering the EPA allows different permit standards
across states, states have substantial variabilities in EPA-imposed water discharge limit (Sigman,
2002) 9. Under the condition, it is possible that states make a trade-off between economic growth
and environmental protection. Some states have lesser environmental regulations on the water
discharge permit limit to attract industry for economic development and interests (Lynch,
Stretesky, and Long, 2017).
Based on the analysis of green crime and justice within a political economic perspective,
the massive quantities of direct discharge of pollutants into waterways are regarded as a greenstate crime that leads to ecological disorganization (Schnaiberg, 1980). As mentioned before, green
criminologists have proposed the definitions of green crime that expand beyond the legality to
encompass activities that lead to ecological, nonhuman species or human health harms (Lynch,
1990; Lynch et al., 2017; Beirne and South, 2007; White, 2009; Brisman and South, 2013). The
discharge into waterways from facilities (e.g., POTW emissions) are conceptualized as green
crimes because the emissions are legally acceptable yet toxin pollutants that promotes the
disruption of waterway ecosystems.

9

Sigman (2002) states that there are variabilities for NPDES permits across states for five types of contaminations
such as cadmium, copper, lead, mercury, and zinc. For cadmium, the weakest strict state limit was four times lower
than the strongest strict limit; for copper, 38 times lower, for lead 312 times lower; for mercury, 750 times lower;
and for zinc, 60 times lower.
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Nonpoint Source of Water Pollution
Today nonpoint source pollution is the leading cause of water pollution problems.
Nonpoint sources come from various activities so that the effects of these contaminants on waters
may not be always fully evaluated (EPA, 2020). The primary origins of nonpoint source pollution
are unclassified (i.e., unidentifiable) specific sources. For example, while we know that nonpoint
source pollution comes from rain or snowfall, we cannot necessarily identify the source of the
pollution in the rain or snowfall. Other nonpoint sources include agricultural runoff, roadway and
sewer system runoff, pollution drift and deposition, and even hydrological modification (e.g., shifts
in water tables).
Petroleum storage in underground tanks poses one of greatest threats to ground water
quality. According to the EPA (2003), approximately one-third of all such storage facilities in the
United States leak. One example is large-scale ecological additions caused by oil refiners and other
chemical plants located in the stretch of the Mississippi River (Southern Louisiana) between New
Orleans and Baton Rouge – that is called, “Cancer Alley” because of its concentration of
petrochemical plants. One fourth of US petrochemical supply comes from Cancer Alley. This area
is a designated enterprise zone that attracts the large number of oil refineries and petrochemical
facilities with tax incentives and lax regulatory regime on business and economic development
(Lynch et al., 2017). However, the high concentration of the chemical and oil refiners located in
Cancer Alley poses not only threats to human health (e.g., cancer risk) but also contributes to the
massive amount of wetland loss. Wetlands play a crucial role in revitalizing ecosystems,
controlling water flow, and providing storm buffers (Darvis, 2010) 10.

10

Wetlands work like a sponge, socking up and storing extra runoff water after a storm and then releasing it slowly
into an aquifer or nearby stream or lake. Without wetlands to temporarily store storm waters, flooding would be
more prevalent. Retrieved from https://www2.southeastern.edu/orgs/oilspill/wetlands.html.
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According to the news article, Propublica 11 , even though a large concentration of
petrochemical plants has significant adverse effects on the residents and the ecosystem of Southern
Louisiana, seven large new petrochemical plants have been approved for areas in the stretch of the
Mississippi River since 2015. The number of industrial plants in Louisiana that reported their toxic
discharge increased from 255 to 320 (25% increase) during the last three decades (1998 to 2017).
The article indicates that: alternative sites are not attractive to the plants in terms of economic
sense because Cancer Alley provides ‘built-in advantages for manufacturers such as easy access
to ship lane, plenty of cheap land for facilities and a lax regulation on them’. Thus, the economic
advantages of them disregard the environmental impact like wetland loss.
Another case of ecological additions into a river water is related with abandoned mining
operations. On Aug. 2010, the EPA accidentally discharged more than three million gallons of
wastewater into the Animas River during investigation on leaks from an abandoned mine in
Colorado. The spill of poisoned waste polluted over 100 miles of the river and damaged
communities in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and the Navajo Nation that relied on water from the
river. To note, beyond this local disaster, there are around 500,000 abandoned mines scattered
across the nation. According to the EPA, the drainage from these abandoned mines has affected
40% of the headwaters of Western watersheds. (Brisman et al., 2017; Editorial 2015). One of
reason for the problem comes from the General Mining Law of 1872 that permits mining
corporations to obtain federal land for $2.50 -$5.00 an acre, with no royalty, lax environmental
regulations on the mining operation, and no cleanup afterward (Earthworks, 2019). The purpose
of the law was to promote Western expansion. Currently, the Hardrock Mining and Reclamation
Act of 2015 amends this 19th century law by imposing a federal minerals royalty, establishing fund

11

See, https://www.propublica.org/article/welcome-to-cancer-alley-where-toxic-air-is-about-to-get-worse (published
on Oct. 30. 2019)
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for the cleanup of abandoned mines and requiring a review of areas that may be inappropriate for
mining (Earthworks, 2019).
There are various types of contamination on water, and its source varies widely across
geographic areas (Vanderwarker, 2012). As green criminologists within the political economic
approach indicated, the capitalist system’s continuous search for increases in production explains
why environmental harm such as water pollution occurs. Massive ecological additions that result
from dominant local industries (e.g., petrochemical companies in the stretch of the Mississippi
River and western expansion of mining industry) threaten the ecosystem such as local water and
cause human health complications. However, the burdens of contamination risk or proximity to
contaminated sources are not equally distributed across different racial, ethnic, and class. Those
who are socioeconomically disadvantaged and/or ethnic minorities are unequally exposed to
contaminated water victims, and become green or environmental victims of these pollutants.

Challenges in Drinking Water Management
Water systems in the United States are well-developed that provide good-quality,
reliable water supply and wastewater services to most of the American population. However,
there are still serious and increasing challenges confronting the water resource systems across the
nation, which, if left unaddressed, can pose threats to public health as well as economic vitality
(Cooley, 2012: 168; EPA, 2016). For example, drinking water systems across the U.S. are under
pressure from 1) aging infrastructure, 2) unregulated contaminants in the nation’s tap water (e.g.,
perfluorianted compounds), 3) fragmented water industry and 4) lack of transparency and
bureaucratic culture of institutions that undermine the sense of water security (Contorno,
Sarango, and Harlan, 2018; Cooley, 2012; Siegel, 2019).
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Aging Water Infrastructure
Drinking water infrastructure across the nation was largely built during three great
construction booms: the 1890s, the 1920s, and the years after World War Ⅱ. In each of these
three periods, the water pipes were made of different materials and applied by different
manufacturing skills to be connected into the water mains (Sigel, 2019). While the underground
pipes at different times have different life expectancies, thousands of miles of the pipes from
each of these three ears will come to the end of their expected life span, and all at about the same
time (AWWA, 2001). To better understand this issue, the American Water Works Association
(AWWA) conducted studies of 20 large and median drinking water utilities and found that the
oldest pipes that were buried in the 1890s last for 120 years; the pipes from the 1920s, for 100
years; and the post-World War Ⅱ pipes for around 75 years (AWWA, 2001: p.6).
Frequent repairs and modern technology can make their life expectancy longer but not
forever. As the AWWA stated (2001), ‘the dawn of the replacement era’ has arrived. Recently,
there are more than 240,000 water mains disruptions in annual in the United States. These water
main breaks lose more than two trillion gallons of drinking water per year – it costs as much as
$10.2 billion for the lost water. The rate of water main breaks is increasing, which means that
more of water pipes need to be replaced (ASCE, 2017).
The replacement cost for the aged drinking water pipes could be more than $1 trillion
over the next 25 years (AWWA, 2001; Siegel, 2019). By 2030, the average water fees could rise
as much as three times to pay for the new infrastructure. On average, the replacement cost value
of water mains including water treatment plants and pumps is about $10,000 per household.
Water affordability is already a serious issue for some communities with limited local financial
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ability. In Detroit, for example, as water rates had been increasing annually for several reasons
(i.e., insufficient local tax base, replacement cost of aged water infrastructure, and rising energy
costs), water service was shut off to over 45,000 customers who could not afford rising water
bills (Vanderwarker, 2012). The higher cost of water services is also an emerging concern in
other cities such as Boston, due to more investment in replacement of the aged pipes and oldstyle systems (Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018).
However, the cost for replacement of the aged water infrastructure could be possibly
higher for the customers served by smaller water systems and those in communities with a
declining population such as poor and rural areas, due to the disadvantage of its small scale,
which produces a financial burden on fewer customers (AWWA, 2001). The water problems
caused by the aged water infrastructure disproportionately affects sparsely populated, lowincome communities across the United States, because water infrastructure is local and thus
vulnerable to demographic change (AWWA, 2001; Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018). As
the population grows, financial investment on the water infrastructure is expanded, but as the
population declines, the financial sources of water pipe repair and replacement also shrink,
resulting in financial burdens on the remaining residents (AWWA, 2001).
For example, in 2019 the New Public had a report on rural America’s drinking water
crisis (Jones and Atkin 2018). The report presented one story from Martin County, Kentucky
where more than a thousand families in the community suffered from contaminated drinking
water with excessive volume of disinfectant chemicals. The main causes of this problem came
from aged and deteriorating water supplies with limited financial capacity. According to the
report, millions of rural Americans living from Appalachian in Kentucky to the Texas
borderlands are exposed to unclean and often illegitimate levels of chemicals in drinking water
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from aging water pipes. Big cities’ water issues like Flint, Michigan, attracted the most attention
on the water issues, because the failing water systems affect great numbers of residents at once.
However, in reality, rural and small communities suffer from most of health-based violations of
drinking water regulations across the nation due to aged water-treatment facilities that cannot
adequately filter out the chemicals such as nitrates and trihalomethanes. That is, many of rural
America’s drinking water problems can be attributed to aged, broken, untrustworthy water
infrastructure such as leaky pipes, clunky filtration systems, and back-up sewers. Regarding rural
America’s drinking water crisis, the New Public (Jones and Atkin, 2018)12 said,
“As the economic gap separating rural America from its urban and suburban
counterparts continues to grow, this basic inequality is set to become more entrenchedand possibly more dangerous, as sickness seeps into rural America”.
Fixing a broken water main and replacing the aged water pipes are expensive and
inconvenient. However, if the replacement of the aged infrastructure is deferred, it will bring
more cost for emergency repairs and more inconvenience and the potential for poor drinking
water quality (Siegel, 2019). To note, rural and low-income communities are disproportionately
vulnerable to the water-related problems that can result from aged water infrastructure.

Drinking Water Quality
Safe and healthy drinking water is considered as a basic human right. Over the past
century, the United States has improved the overall quality of drinking water as well as reduced
the types and amounts of contaminants released into water resources such as rivers and lakes.

See the New Republic, “Rural American’s Drinking-Water Crisis” retrieved from
https://newrepublic.com/article/147011/rural-americas-drinking-water-crisis.
12
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General access to the safety of drinking water has been achieved through massive investment in
water related infrastructure, municipal water purification, and wastewater systems. The federal
government has also contributed to safe drinking water through implementing water quality laws
(e.g., the Clean Water Act, the Safety Drinking Water Act) that legally enforce water-related
agencies to identify contaminants in water and to protect Americans from the toxic substances.
Through these efforts, Americans receive good quality of drinking water. However, not
all Americans gain access to or afford healthy drinking. Increased detection of synthetic
chemicals in treated drinking water - such as insecticides, pharmaceuticals, fragrance mixtures,
and flame retardants - exacerbates uncertainty and concern about drinking water quality
(Stackelberg et al., 2004).
According to GAO, 700 chemicals are annually added into the environment and over
800,000 chemicals are now registered for use in the United States (GAO, 2009). It is possible
that some of these chemicals get into drinking water during treatment and distribution process
(Ternes et al., 2002; Allen, 2012). Community water systems typically include 1) a treatment
facility that stores and uses chemicals to eliminate biological contaminants and 2) a distribution
system that consists of water towers, piping grids, pumps, and other components provides treated
water to customers. Diverse mixes of synthetic chemicals are often detected in drinking water
through leaks during the treatment and distribution processes. Synthetic chemicals in drinking
water are also identified because conventional approaches (i.e., coagulation, sedimentation,
purifications, and chemical sterilization) of water treatment are often ineffective at eliminating
the chemicals (Ternes et al., 2002; Allen, 2012).
To protect Americans from the health hazards in drinking water, EPA has established
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for over 90 chemical compounds under the Safe
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Drinking Water Act (EPA, 2009: 15). However, there are many unregulated contaminants
identified in drinking water. According to the report by The Environmental Working Group
(EWG, 2019a), for example, collected data from about 50,000 community drinking water
utilities across 50 states by annual tests found more than 160 unregulated contaminants in
drinking water across the United States. The study found that some amounts of contaminants
found in drinking water affect human health – particularly harm to the brain and nervous system,
fertility problems and/or hormone functioning disruption, and changes in the growth and
development of the fetus (EWG, 2019a).
The EWG’s report (2019a) also stated that legal limits for the level of contaminants in
drinking water are often higher than health standards recommended by scientific researchers.
That is, while many of contaminants detected by community water utilities’ test are found at
levels that may be legally acceptable under the Safe Drinking Water Act, scientific studies have
found these are well beyond levels to affect human health (Hayes et al., 2002; Langlois et al.,
2010; Raham, Yanful, and Jasim, 2009).
Furthermore, there is often more than one chemical identified in contaminated drinking
water (Allen, 2012). According to studies, mixtures of chemicals can pose health risks that a
single chemical does not (Jaeger, Carlson, and Porter, 1999; Kortenkamp, 2007). For example,
the mixture of pesticides and nitrates is likely to cause biological change in human health, while
individual nitrates would rarely lead to such adverse outcomes (Jaeger, Carlson, and Porter,
1999).
Although unregulated contaminants, inadequacy of the safe standards, and mixture of
chemicals may cause adverse health effects, the EPA takes slow steps toward the primary goal
under the Safe Drinking Water Act - 1) identification of contaminants in drinking water supplies
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at concentrations that possibly threaten human health; and 2) determination regarding
appropriate actions to protect Americans from health risks incurred by contaminated drinking
water (Allen, 2012; Sigel, 2019; EWG, 2019a). Since the 1996 Amendments to the Safe
Drinking Water Act, the EPA is required to issue a new list of no more than 30 unregulated
contaminants to be monitored by public water systems every five years – known as the
Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Rule (EPA, 2016). There are three separate processes for
the EPA to decide whether a new contaminant is regulated under the law: first, the chemical
compound has proven to cause adverse health effects; second, the contaminant is frequently
found at levels in drinking water; and third, the EPA must prove that there is a “meaningful
opportunity” to reduce the public health risk through regulation.
Obviously, the multi-step process for the EPA requires many years to complete.
Specifically, “the EPA evaluate the feasibility of removing the containment, the affordability of
containment removal technologies for small water systems, and the costs and benefits of the
regulation when proposing and promulgating a drinking water standard (EPA, 2016: 15)”. To
date, however, the EPA has not added any new contaminants to the regulated list for drinking
water through the process, even though there are large number of new chemicals introduced
every year (EPA, 2016).
One reason why the result of this process are slow stems from the lack of clarity in the
1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act. Under such legal condition, decision about
regulating new chemicals for the safety of drinking water is subjective. Specifically, the decision
of whether to regulate a hazard component is based how the potential for it must cause public
health risks, how frequently the contaminant must be present in drinking water, and how many
medical problems (e.g., birth defects, hormonal disruptions) must present to be “meaningful”
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(Allen, 2012; Siegel, 2019). Due to the ambiguity of the law, the determination to regulate or
not-and at what level-depends on political pressure (Siegel, 2019). In the case of perchlorate, for
example, the EPA announced that it does not need to regulate perchlorate under the Bush
Administration in 2008. When the Obama Administration came into office in 2009, on February
11, 2011, the EPA announced that perchlorate posed a threat to the public health as many as 16
million Americans, and that it should be regulated under the contaminant requirement of the Safe
Drinking Water Act. However, the regulation of perchlorate was not completed during the
Obama Administration because of different views by the U.S. military, NASA, and the
Department of Energy that are the largest users for perchlorate for several decades (Siegel,
2019). Under the Trump Administration, in October 2019, the U.S. District Court extended the
EPA’s deadline for final perchlorate regulation from December, 2019 until June, 2020
(Association of State Drinking Water Admonitors13, 2019).
The other reason for the delay comes from non-health-based factors, a cost-benefit
analysis, in the case of drinking water standards (Allen, 2012). When deciding whether to
regulate a contaminant, a standard level or safe level of contamination in drinking water must be
determined. This process requires a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether the benefits exceed
the costs: it considers whether the cost of water treatment technologies that can remove the
contaminant from the water is worth protecting human health (Allen, 2012; See EPA, 2016).
The setting of safe drinking water standards often depends on economic comprises in order to
keep treatment costs down (EWG, 2019a). For the water utilities as well as municipalities, when
the legally allowed amount of a contaminant in drinking water is set to be lower, the reduction
standard requires advanced treatment technologies, which impose additional economic burden on

13

See, https://www.asdwa.org/2019/10/04/court-extends-epas-deadline-for-final-perchlorate-regulation/
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their budget. With the financial stakes linked to the decision, the EPA delay or deny additional
regulation or does not set a strict standard for the safe contaminant threshold (Allen, 2012;
Siegel, 2019; EWG, 2019a).
However, the cost-benefit analysis of the drinking water regulation cannot
comprehensively evaluate all the things. Specifically, as Akerman stated (2007: 5), while it can
precisely estimate the cost of water contamination reduction, it is much more difficult to quantify
the benefits of the treatment - especially, non-monetary value such as the length and quality of
human life. The EPA’s estimate can be a substantial underestimate of the value that most
populations would emphasize on preventing illness or disease caused by being continuously
exposed to toxin in the water (Akerman, 2007).
In addition, as the EWG report mentioned (2019a), under the cost-benefit analysis, the
EPA has not effectively fulfilled the purpose of the Safe Drinking Water Act, which states that
drinking water regulation should consider:
“the effects of the contaminant on the general population and on groups within the
general population such as infants, children, pregnant women, the elderly, individuals
with a history of serious illness, or other subpopulations that are identified as likely to be
at greater risk of adverse health effects due to exposure to contaminant in drinking water
than the general population”14.
Based on the law, water treatment regulation is required to consider the vulnerable
populations, because they are more likely to suffer from illness and disease by lower levels of
contaminants in drinking water than the general population (Allen, 2012). A recent EWG’s
study (2019b) also indicates that amounts of chemicals that were previously regulated to be

14

Title 42. U.S. Code § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i)(V). National Drinking Water Regulations.
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acceptable for drinking water (i.e., the legally acceptable amounts of nitrate15, 10 ppm), can
enhance the risk of cancer and may damage fetus growth and development (e.g., cause low birth
weight, premature birth and neural tube defects). EWG suggests that the current legal limit of the
nitrate level is too high to protect against cancer and harms to postmenopausal women. Based on
their meta-analysis, the nitrate amount that is not associated with cancers and pregnancy
problems would be 0.14 ppm – 70 times lower than the EPA’s current legal limit (EWG,
2019b:5). Given the result of study indicating the inadequacy of the legally acceptable level of
the chemical, in 2017, the EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System program, IRIS, began to
review the effect of nitrate in drinking water on human health. However, the assessment for
nitrate was suspended because it was not identified as a priority for fiscal year 2019 (IRIS
Program Outlook, 2019).

Fragmented Water System
Fragmented system of the U.S. water industry is another challenge. There are over 51,000
community water systems in the U.S serving about 300 million American residents (EPA, 2015).
The U.S. has 3,141 counties, average sixteen drinking water utilities work per county. Around
92% of the U.S community water systems serve fewer than 10,000 customers. In case of
California, there are around 7,500 water utilities; in Los Angeles County alone, there are about
200 water utilities (Orange County Water District, 2014: 9). As is true for the abundance of the

15

Nitrate is a chemical in commercial fertilizers and manure that can run off of farm fields into sources of drinking
water. Nitrate, primarily from agricultural runoff, contaminates the public water supplies of thousands of
communities nationwide, with the problem most severe in farm country. The EPA’s legal limit for nitrate in drinking
water is 10 ppm. It was set in 1962 to protect against so-called blue baby syndrome (EWG, 2019:4).
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U.S. water systems, many of California’s water systems provide drinking water to very small
numbers of customers (Siegel, 2019).
When comparing the water systems with other countries – for example, the U.K has
fewer than 30 – the U.S water systems are also relatively fragmented. The bigger areas and
relatively low population density of the U.S. possibly explain the many water systems. However,
as a study indicated (Levin et al., 2002), “the U.S. water industry has remained quite
decentralized even while local public services such as schools and police have consolidated
substantially (p.44).” When even comparing other public service systems in the U.S. – there are
approximately 3,000 natural gas utilities and 3,888 electric utilities in the U.S – the more than
51,000 water systems are too decentralized to be managed and regulated efficiently.
It should be noted that the severe fragmentation of the U.S water industry is caused by, in
part, the decades-long trend of urban and suburban development (Siegel, 2019). According to
Siegel (2019),
“… from the end of World War Ⅱ and the postwar economic boom until the early 1970s,
real estate developers used cheaper land and lower taxes to build new communities near,
but not in, urban centers. For reasons of identity, cost savings, and control, the
developers and the communities they created often preferred to have a water utility of
their own, rather than tapping into a large nearby system.” (p. 150).
The urban and suburban development plan for several decades in the U.S. has resulted in
fragmented water system (Siegel, 2019). As shown on the table “U.S. Communities Water
Systems” below, eighty-two percent of water systems (over 42,000) are “small” 16 and “very
small” 17 systems serving fewer 3,300 people (EPA, 2016). In contrast, only seven percent of the

16
17

The EPA designates drinking water systems serving fewer than 3,300 people as small systems.
The EPA designates drinking water systems serving less than 500 people as very small systems.
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community water systems provide drinking water for over 10,000 populations and 426 water
systems (0.8%) serve populations of 100,000 or more.
With more than 51,000 community water systems, there is much duplication of effort that
impedes operational efficiencies such as billing, customer services, and water testing (Duffy,
2013; Levin et al., 2002). Most of all, many of these systems, especially small systems, find it
difficult to deliver safe drinking water (Siegel, 2019). With larger customer base, the water
systems can adjust to regulatory changes of the Safe Drinking Water Acts; have specialized
utility operators; and pay for new equipment and upgraded technology. In contrast, monitoring
and water testing are already a burden on small systems (EPA, 2016). The cost of installing new
treatment systems is sometimes unaffordable due to diseconomies of scale. It is also difficult for
many of small systems to hire full-time experts to work for their operations (Levin et al., 2002).
Unlike larger systems, many small water systems, thus, face difficulties (e.g., finical incapacity,
limited technical and managerial capacities) in meeting the Safe Drinking Water Acts and in
ensuring the quality of their water supplies (Teimann, 2006: p. 15).

Table 1. U.S Community Water System (2015).

Source: EPA 2015, as cited in 2015 State of the Water Industry, AWWA.
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For that reason, the EPA has provided exemptions18 from monitoring and water testing
requirement and waives for compliance of the regulations targeted at small systems. Under the
exemption rule, small systems serving fewer than 3,301 customers may have a waiver that allows
one or more additional 2-year extension periods to achieve compliance if they can prove that
they do not have the financial capacity to meet water regulations. As Siegel (2019) stated, the
monitoring exemption, while it can alleviate the burden small systems face, may bring a risk that
“the presence of a contaminant is not detected until after harm has occurred (p. 154).”
Small systems generally have higher rates of health-based violations compared to larger
one. According to the report of Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC, 2019), more than
80% of health-based violations in the country were committed by small systems. In addition,
very small systems – those have less than 500 customers – had 50% of health-based violations,
even though they serve only 4.7milion customers.
According to the EPA’s drinking water action plan report, it also highlights that
“economically disadvantaged communities and small drinking water systems are facing
disproportionate risks as a result of underinvestment in drinking water infrastructure and limited
technical, financial, and/or managerial capacity.” (EPA, 2016: p. ⅲ). Particularly, small water
utilities serving poor communities that are already exacerbated by aging infrastructure confront
additional challenges: they face restricted access to loans and grants due to lack of technical
capability of reporting requirements and weak tax bases (Allaire, Wu and Lall, 2017;
Vanderwarker, 2012). Taken together, these challenges represent environmental justice issues
(EPA, 2016).

According to Variance and Exemptions Rule, “exemptions allow eligible systems additional time to build
capacity in order to achieve and maintain regulatory compliance with newly promogulated National Primary
Drinking Water Regulation (NPDWR), while continuing to provide acceptable levels of public health protection.”
(EPA, 2004).
1818
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As mentioned earlier, more attention has given to urban drinking water issues like the
Flint water crisis because the large faulty system in an urban area can affect a great number of
residents at once (EWG, 2019a). However, most health-based violations of safe drinking water
acts are committed by small utilities. Obviously, consolidation strategies serve as one of ways to
solve drinking water related problems (Duffy, 2013; Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019; Siegel,
2019). Consolidation of smaller water systems would have access to improvement and capital in
service and integrated water systems would provide good quality water by increasing the base of
customers (Siegel, 2019).

Exclusive Institutions
The Safe Drinking Water Act was originally established in 1974 and amended in 1986
and 1996 by recognizing “source water protection, operator training, funding for water system
improvements, and public information as important components of safe drinking water.” (EPA,
2004). Especially, the Safe Drinking Water Act has emphasized the importance of public
information and consultation – it recognizes that “everyone has a right to know what is in their
drinking water, where it comes from, how it treated, and how to help protect it.” (EPA, 2004). As
the EPA’s action plan (2016) also recognized, transparency and inclusiveness in decision-making
process on drinking water depend on how better the public understands their drinking water
about drinking water quality, water system operations, and the sustainable resources of safe
water. Under the role and legal responsibility, the EPA provides public information materials: for
example, annual summary reports of water system compliance with safety regulations of
drinking water must be conducted and distributed to the public. All community water systems
are also required to prepare and provide annual ‘consumer confidence reports’ about source and
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quality of drinking water they provide, including information detected chemicals and possible
health effects (EPA, 2004).
Water and environmental agencies try not only to distribute public information regarding
drinking water, but also to promise public participation during decision-making processes. The
EPA proposes public meetings, cooperating with states, water systems, and environmental and
civic organizations to enhance public engagement in the environmental decision-making process.
For example, the public has a chance to be involved in developing source water assessment
programs, planning in drinking water state revolving fund, and operator certification programs
(EPA, 2004)19.
Although water and environmental agencies have good intentions in water management
and regulation with the democratic norm embedded in the environmental law – particularly
public participation provisions (Cole and Foster, 2001), there are ongoing problems with the way
they currently work – “rigidity and bureaucratic culture” that leads to exclusiveness in decisionmaking process (Contorno, Sarango and Harlan, 2018; Siegel, 2019). As the EPA’s action plan
(2016) also proposed,
“… there is a need to strengthen communication to the public, in an accessible and
understandable format, of more timely information on drinking water quality and impacts

According to the EPA’s report, the Safe Drinking Water Act that was amended in 1996 highlights public
participation to ensure safe drinking water. Among roles and responsibilities under the law, 1) source water
assessment programs, 2) drinking water state revolving fund, and 3) operator certification is cooperated with the
public (EPA, 2004).
Source water assessment programs is to assess sources of drinking water from rivers, lakes, and ground
water wells and to identify potential sources of contamination and to determine how susceptible the sources
are to these threats.
Drinking water state revolving fund helps water systems make infrastructure or management improvements
or to help systems assess and protect sources water.
Operator certification programs are EPA-approved guidelines to ensure safety of the operators of
community and non-community water systems.
19

35

to public health. What’s needed is not just more information, but also better
communication of the context and meaning of that information.” (p. 18).
That is, water manager and government agencies need to discard their bureaucratic
culture and to build just and inclusive governance that provides equal access to all the residents
with meaningful involvement in the decision-making processes (Contorno, Sarango and Harlan,
2018).
For example, according to interviews of 45 leaders of community organizations (e.g.
local nonprofit groups, watershed association) conducted by the Urban Water Innovation
Network (UWIN), while local water management agencies have good relations with community
groups, some of these agencies have failed to include vulnerable populations (e.g. minorities,
low-income and non-English speaking populations) in important decision-making processes
(Contorno, Sarango and Harlan, 2018). Regardless of what the exclusion intends or not, the
marginalized populations are vulnerable to more powerful interests in environmental decisionmaking processes. One interview of a community leader was cited below from the UWIN’s
report (2018):
“… We’ve seen a lot of state agencies and planning agencies who, they’ll have a
planning meeting at 2pm in downtown Boston, and they expect people to come, and that’s
just never going to work – because low-income people of color are already overburdened
by their economic status, and they need to keep their jobs, they need to bring food to the
table, and if you want to engage them you need to meet them where they’re at…”
(Contorno, Sarango and Harlan, 2018: p. 14).
While the ideal function of participatory promise in the decision-making process
includes a wide range of interests, the identities of the participants, in real world, would have
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more influence on the outcome of the environmental decision (Cole and Foster, 2001). In the
lack of inclusiveness, the decision makers are captured by the voice from wealthier groups with
political powers (see Bullard, 1990).
There is the exemplary case occurred in Warren County in 1980. North Carolina state
representatives decided that Warren County would be a site for landfill of contaminated soil,
even though the county was not geographically central for this purpose (Exchange Project 2006).
Given the demographic composition of Warren County as one of the poorest and most
predominated African American counties in the state of North Carolina, the implications of
environmental injustice cannot be ignored. Since the composition of the soil in Warren County
was not appropriate for containing the waste and the residents relied on the surface water, there
was significant concern for contaminated drinking water affected by the landfill (Geiser and
Waneck, 1983). Even though civil right leaders and environmentalists across the county reacted
against the decision, the governor of North Carolina ordered the construction efforts of the
landfill at Warren County. Contamination continued for approximately twenty years after the
construction, the landfill was finally cleaned up in 2003 – the cost was around $18 million
(Lynch et al., 2017).
The facts of the Flint water crisis also highlight the exclusiveness in decision-making
processes of water management. Given the demographic composition of the Flint resident, who
are majority Black or African American and among the poorest of urban areas in the United
States, they were not given equal access to, and meaningful engagement in, the environmental
decision-making process. According to the Flint Water Advisory Task Force’s (FWATF) report
(2016),
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“the Flint water crisis occurred when state-appointed emergency managers replaced
local representative decision-making in Flint, removing the checks and balances and
public accountability that come with public decision-making.” (p. 1).
After the switch to Flint River water from Detroit’s water system in response to the city’s
financial difficulty, under state-appointed emergency management, water quality problems20
were encountered (Mona Hanna-Attisha et al., 2016). Various state-appointed emergency
managers, not locally elected officials, made numerous decisions, such as decision on use of the
Flint River as a water source for the Flint residents and approval of a sole-contract for the
treatment engineering firm (FWATF, 2016: p.40).
When the Flint residents voiced concerns about water quality and requested a return to
the Detroit’s system, the state-appointed emergency managers were dismissive of residents’
expressed concerns in part because the water problems were manageable. The Michigan
Governor’s office also continued to depend on incorrect information and run the risk of overreliance on a few staff in one or two departments in the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality (MDEQ) and Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS), even
though there were growing evidence from outside experts concerning the harms being generated
(FWATF, 2016). The Governor’s office changed course when MDEQ and MDHHS admitted the
problem of lead in drinking water – the aging Flint water distribution system has a high
percentage of lead pipes and lead plumbing, with lead service lines (Mona Hanna-Attisha et al.,
2016)21.

20

Residents raised concerns about water color, taste, and order, and various health complaints such as skin rashes.
Bacteria, including Escherichia coil, were detected in the distribution system, resulting in Safe Drinking Water Act
violations. Additional disinfection to control bacteria spurred formation of disinfection byproducts including total
trihalomethanes, resulting in Safe Drinking Water Act violations for trihalomethane levels (Mona Hanna-Attisha et
al., 2016: 283).
21
A study found that the rate of children in Flint with elevated levels of lead in their blood doubled as a result of the
contaminated drinking water (Mona Hanna-Attisha et al., 2016)
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At the same time, while the Flint residents’ health and safety were threatened, the
response to the crisis was to provide portable water to the residents as a ‘temporary fix’ (Brisman
et al., 2018) 22. The importation of water to the city most often came in the form of bottled
water23. The flow of capital circulates between the sate-corporate interest that led Flint to provide
bottled water and the state-corporate interests that engage in the further degradation of water and
the commodification of water company (Brisman et al., 2018). Specifically, in 2001 and 2002,
Michigan’s state government granted bottling company, Nestle, a permit to pump up to 400
gallons of water per minute out of Lake Michigan for free – taking only small permitting fee to
the State and private landowner. As the Flint water crisis has left residents dependent on bottled
water, while the residents pay some of the highest water bills in the United States, Nestle was not
required to pay for the extracted water. The company received $13 million in tax breaks and
financial incentives from the state to locate the plant in Michigan (Ecowatch, 2016).

Summary
The chapter 2 described several challenges in drinking water management in the United
States. Even though the United States water systems provide reliable water supply and
wastewater services to the American populations, contaminants that pose a threat to public health
are routinely found in the drinking water from cities to rural areas (Siegel, 2019). No one who is
engaged in the drinking water management intentionally offers poor quality water. However,

22

The importation of bottled water into Flint is just a temporary alternative that adds ecological harms and risk to
Flint residents because of the inevitable difficulties of dealing with the massive increase in plastic waste owed to the
influx of plastic water bottles Brisman et al., 2018: 192).
23
Bottled water is sold at reduced or under-monitored quality at inflated rates. (Brisman and South, 2013, Siegel,
2019). Unlike tap water, bottled water is under the supervision of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). While
the bottled water industry earns $18.5 billion in annual sales in the U.S., the FDA has no institutional structure of
oversight on bottled water. Bottling companies, as a result, are regulated with a self-policing honor system.
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some of regulatory agencies, several operators in drinking water utilities, and a part of local
governors and political leaders have carelessly or irresponsibly responded to drinking water
contaminants (Siegel, 2019).
Based on the previous studies and reports, the nation’s drinking water systems have faced
several problems associated with 1) aging water infrastructure, 2) the slow approach to
unregulated chemicals in drinking water, 3) fragmented community water systems, and 4)
rigidity and bureaucratic culture of water manager and government agencies.
As the report of AWWA (2001) indicated, fixing and replacing broken water mains and
the aged water pipes costs more than $1 trillion over the next 25 years. Especially, rural and lowincome communities are suffering from poor quality water due to aging water infrastructure that
cannot properly filter out the chemicals.
In addition, the EPA’s slow steps in regulation of potential new contaminants in drinking
water contribute to poor quality water. Even though there are more than 120,000 chemical
compounds and products that may threaten drinking water, the EPA has only selected about
ninety of them as hazardous enough to be regulated and failed to add any new chemicals – that
are known of being dangerous with scientific evidence (e.g., the case of perchlorate) – to the
EPA’s regulated chemical contaminant list for drinking water since the passage of 1996
Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act (Seigel, 2019). Because of lack of clarity in the
1996 Amendments and the cost-benefit analysis in setting protective standards, the decision of
whether to regulate a new chemical depends on political pressure that causes the delay of
regulation.
The large number of the U.S. water systems (more than 51,000) is another impediment to
operational efficiencies and delivery of safe drinking water. Most of the nation’s water systems
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(around 80%) are small and very small utilities serving fewer 3,300 customers. These small
systems are likely to face many difficulties (e.g., financial incapacity for the adoption of new
technologies, replacement of broken pipes, and retention of full-time experts) in meeting the Safe
Drinking Water Acts (Teimann, 2006).
For good quality drinking water, water and environmental agencies also need to create
inclusive and just governance that includes a wide range of interests. As the Flint water crisis has
demonstrated, the exclusiveness in decision-making process of water management may not only
lose their transparency, but also threaten the drinking water safety (FWATF, 2016). It is
important for water and environmental agencies to strengthen communication to the public in an
accessible format and enhance public participation in the decision-making process (EPA, 2016).
The chapter 2 focuses on the problems related the United States’ water systems. Next
chapter provides the knowledge of drinking water injustice across the nation. Within the green
criminology, informed by the political-economic framework, it explores causes of drinking water
pollution. And then, unequal distribution of the risk of the contaminated drinking water across
the United States is mentioned with the environmental justice perspective. Based on the politicaleconomic framework, it states that the causes of drinking water injustice are related with three
dimensions: 1) racialized urban planning, 2) profit-oriented water policies, and 3) exclusiveness
of decision-making process in the water governance (Contorno, Sarango and Harlan, 2018).
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CHAPTER THREE:
DRINKING WATER INJUSTICE

Green Criminology: Overview
Since the initial idea of a green criminology emerged – first suggested by Lynch (1990: 4)
as “the study of crimes committed against humanity through environmental destruction” – there
are varying definitions of green criminology and green crimes. Beirne and South (2007: p. ⅹⅲ),
for example, proposed that “a green crime involves the study of those 1) harms against humanity,
2) against the environment (including space) and 3) against non-human animals committed by both
the powerful institutions (e.g., governments, transnational corporations, military apparatuses) and
also by ordinary people.” Based on the prior definitions of green criminology and green crimes,
Lynch and Stretesky (2011: p. 2) proposed that “green criminology provides space within
criminology to examine the nexus between environmental problems, the definition of harms
against nature as crimes, the need to reconsider criminal justice practices and policy in relationship
to the environmental harms they produce, the variety of victims environmental offenses create (for
human and non-human species, as well as ecological segments such as wetlands, forest, air, and
land, etc.) and the effect of environmental toxins on ecological systems and species’ health and
behavior.”
This diversity of views about green criminology can embrace a wide range of studies and
encompass different interpretation to the environmental crime – from the traditional perspective
to the broader conceptualization of harm. Specifically, while many studies within green
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criminology pay attention to environmental harms that are legally defined as crimes – harms
against nature (e.g., illegal dumping of waste water into a stream), and harms against nonhuman
animals (e.g., wildlife trafficking, smuggling and poaching), other studies focus on human actions
that harm ecosystems, yet are not typically criminal to the extent that they are not violations of
criminal law – for example, ecological withdrawals and destruction driven by capitalist expansion
(Stretesky, Long and Lynch, 2013). The latter working within green criminology that focuses on
social harms regardless of legality (see Hillyard and Toms, 2007) contributes to various and serious
environmental harms the criminal law does not address – these issues have been also overlooked
within orthodox criminology (Lynch et al., 2017; McClanahan, 2014; White, 2009).

Political-Economic Perspective
Today, while green criminology has developed considerably and “provided the broad filed
of criminology with a way to confront harms (whether defined as ‘crime’ or not) that affect the
planet as a whole, particular natural environments and species other than humans” (Beirne et al.,
2018: 295), it faces a problem – a lack of agreed upon definitions about what constitutes green
criminology (Lynch et al., 2017; Eman, Mesko, and Fields, 2007). Moreover, green criminology
has no single theory as such; it has many different substantive and theoretical dimensions that have
been described as a green “perspective” (White, 2010: p. 411). That is to say, inadequate
terminology and absence of commonly accepted definition has impeded efforts to develop a
theoretical framework of green criminology as a new division of criminology (Lynch and
Stretesky, 2011).
These theoretical problems facing green criminology have been addressed by employing a
political-economic approach to green crimes and harms (Stretesky, Long and Lynch, 2013; Lynch
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et al., 2013) consistent with Lynch’s (1990) original definition of green criminology. Such an
approach focuses on human activities that result in green crimes within the theoretical framework
on how society’s economic organization impacts society’s social structure, including the type and
amount of ecological destruction, the nature of environmental regulations, and the social responses
to green crime (Lynch et al., 2017). Thus, green criminology, informed by the political-economic
perspective, attempts to examine green crimes – or “ecological destruction and ecological
disorganization” 24 – caused by the overproduction/overconsumption focus of capitalism that
dominates political-economic organization worldwide (Lynch et al., 2013; Lynch et al., 2017: p.
10-11; Lynch et al., 2019).
For example, green criminologists draw upon Alan Schnaiberg’s Treadmill of Production
(ToP) theory to provide the theoretical framework to understand green crime (Stretesky, Long, and
Lynch, 2013; Lynch et al., 2013; Lynch et al., 2017). Schnaiberg (1980) introduced the ToP
perspective that focuses on the contradiction between capitalism and nature. According to the ToP,
capitalism must continually expand because the organizational feature of capitalism is designed
for economic growth and accumulation of wealth, disregarding all adverse environmental side
effects. Schnaiberg (1980) stated that capitalism results in ecological disorganization by
consuming and polluting nature. The ecological system may be exploited – by the extraction and
exploitation of natural resources, deforestation, mining – to produce commodities (Lynch et al.,
2017).

According to Lynch et al. (2017: 10), “ecological disorganization is a measure, determined on the basis of
scientific studies, of the disruption of ecosystems and ecosystem functions by human activity. Disruptions may be
direct, as when the extraction of raw materials (e.g., mining, drilling, timber harvests) pollutes or destroys
environments. Or they may be indirect, as when clear-cutting a forest eventually causes a decline in species living
there that play important roles in maintaining a healthy ecosystem.”
24
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As Schnaiberg (1980) stated, there are two main ways the capitalist system of expanding
resource consumption causes ecological disorganization: 1) “ecological withdrawals” and 2)
“ecological additions”. In general, ecological withdrawals refer to a mechanism for expanding the
extraction of natural resources from the environment to increase the production of commodities
(Lynch et al., 2017). The increase in withdrawals and production causes ecological disorganization
because it shrinks the volume of nature’s production as well as limit the ability of the ecosystem
to provide the conditions for life. Ecological additions consist of toxin byproducts that the capital
system of production adds to the nature (Lynch et al., 2013; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch, 2013).
Thus, the capitalist system of production – when human action interferes with nature’s production
systems to make commodities – creates harms against nature (Lynch et al., 2013; Foster, Clark,
and York, 2010). Within the core perspective of the “treadmill” of crime, various examples of
harmful acts have been examined such as greenhouse gas emissions, chemical pollution, mining,
deforestation, and factory farming (Stretesky, Long, and Lynch, 2013).

Environmental Justice Perspective
Green criminology, informed by the political-economic perspective, provides
criminologists with interdisciplinary theoretical framework that adopt broad conceptualization of
harm to explore the etiology of green crimes. The Schnaiberg’s ToP approach is especially suitable
for green criminological applications because it provides a theoretical lens for explaining how and
why green crimes occur (Lynch et al., 2017; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch, 2013). The politicaleconomic approach to green criminological research also emphasizes a role of capitalism and
power relations in the production of environmental harm. According to Stretesky, Long, and Lynch
(2013), harmful activities for the purpose of increasing or supporting production result in social
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disorganization, which is usually exploited by dominant economic classes, stimulated and
maintained by the state, and experienced badly by racial minorities and the poor.
The exposure to environmental problems is not equally distributed, but disproportionately
affects different racial, class, and ethnic groups – the broad term for research that finds patterns of
“differential victimization” relating to environmental harms is environmental justice (Lynch et al.,
2017; White, 2010). Research has found that communities with higher percentage minority
residents and high rates of poverty are associated with chemical accidents, pollution, hazardous
waste sites, and other environmental hazards (Bullard 1990; Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp, 2001;
Stretesky and Lynch, 1999; 2002; Sampson and Winter, 2016).
Nowadays, green criminologists focus on the association between the disproportionate
exposure to environmental toxins that can affect criminal behavior, especially violence (Barrett,
2013; Lynch and Stretesky, 2014). Proximity to some chemicals, such as lead, increases the
likelihood of brain impairment, generating behavioral disorders (e.g., learning disability,
aggression, and impulsivity), leading to antisocial behavior, violence and crime (Barrett, 2013;
Lynch et al., 2006). Consequently, environmental toxins possibly increase crime rates in lowincome and minority communities through disproportionately high concentrations of chemicals
that alter behaviors. In addition, green criminologists have explored the unequal enforcement of
environmental laws. They examine how social demographics affect the distribution of
environmental enforcement such as inspections and punishments (Lynch et al., 2017). For
example, criminal monetary penalties against corporations located in poor and minority
communities are smaller compared to white and affluent communities (Lavelle and Coyle, 1992;
Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns, 2004a, 2004b). Konisky (2009) also found that chemical facilities
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situated in poor communities have few inspections of environmental enforcement staff so that such
violations are less likely to be reported in low-income areas.
While scholars have described green criminology in diverse ways, scientifically
measurable environmental harm, social equity, and power relations are commonly emphasized
within green criminology (Lynch et al., 2017). Based on the political-economic framework of
green criminology, contaminated drinking water problems deserve attention because it can pose
an acute threat to the public health as environmental harm that is socially and historically
constructed. An environmental justice perspective can be employed to help explain why the burden
of the risk of drinking water pollution is not equally distributed.
The next section focuses on drinking water pollution with the political-economic
perspective and explores the differential effects of the contaminated drinking water suffered by
marginalized human populations.

Drinking Water Pollution and Environmental Justice
There are various types of threat to drinking water quality. As mentioned before,
untreated sewage from commercial and industrial practices, agricultural runoff, industrial sources
like oil and gas drilling can contribute to poor water quality. In addition to the contaminated
water resource, the U.S. drinking water system faces many challenges such as aging
infrastructure, limited funding to water utilities, fragmented water industry, and profit-oriented
management (Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018; EPA, 2016). According to a 2017 Natural
Resources Defense Council report (NRDC), in 2015, approximately 25% of U.S. residents (77
million population) were served by water utilities that violated the Safe Drinking Water Act
(Fedinick et al., 2017). However, the risk of contaminated drinking water is not spread equally
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across the United States. As the Flint water crisis has shown, communities of color and/or poor
are especially considering drinking water safety. For example, in California’s Central Valley,
Balazs et al (2011) found that community water systems serving larger percentages of Hispanic
residents provide drinking water with higher nitrate levels. Numerous studies have also
demonstrated that community water utilities serving a larger proportion of minority and poor
population had higher frequency for health violations of drinking water acts compared to those
serving majority white and wealthy communities (Balazs et al., 2011; Cory and Rahman, 2009;
Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019; Pilley et al., 2009; Schaider et al., 2019; McDonald and
Jones, 2018)
Drinking water contamination is consistently detected in low-income communities and
communities of color because they are less resourced (e.g., absence of tax bases and lower
relative household incomes) and find it relatively difficult to obtain supports for water
infrastructure improvements (Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018; Siegel, 2019). For example,
Hispanic communities along the 2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border, known as “colonias”, face
disparities in water-related infrastructure maintenance and lack of drinking water resources, due
to lack of tax base and decades of disinvestment (Pilley et al., 2009). According to the Rural
Community Assistance Partnership, around 30% of colonial residents did not have access to safe
drinking water in 2015. These impoverished communities do not have access to other basic
infrastructure and services, including sewer systems, solid waste disposal, and storm drainage
(Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019). According to a 2009 report of Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas (FRBD), in Texas colonias, approximately, 30% of residents live below the poverty level
and average incomes, in some areas, are as low as $5,000 per year. These areas have long been
subject to environmental injustice, but their water problems are largely invisible to the public.
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Environmental justice studies also indicate that communities that are socially vulnerable
and politically disempowered have been historically targeted by hazardous industrial facilities as
their favorable places (Bullard, 1990; Bullard et al., 2008; Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018).
These communities are concerned about water pollution caused by environmentally destructive
activities like gas drilling, hazardous waste landfill, manufacturing, and intensive agriculture
production (Taylor, 2014; Schaider et al., 2019). For example, according to a report by the
Environmental Justice Health Alliance (EJHA) for Chemical Policy Reform, Coming Clean, and
the Center for Effective Government (2018), disproportionate numbers of people of color and
low-income residents lived close to high-risk chemical facilities areas, what is called ‘fenceline
zones’. These fenceline zone populations were more likely to face chemical releases or
explosions that can often threaten water quality. They also faced higher risk of cancer and
respiratory disease from toxic air pollution.
According to the EPA (2015), U.S facilities reported 20,432 hazardous substance
spills from 2005 to 2014 – approximately, average 2,000 spills occur in each year. The chemical
spills can pose a threat to the drinking water sources as well as human health condition such as
nervous system dysfunction and cancer. The risk of the chemical spills is, however, not equally
distributed. Majority non-white counties are more likely to face these toxic substance spills than
majority white counties. One of the examples is a chemical incident occurred in Charleston,
West Virginia in 2014. A chemical storage tank at Freedom Industries near Charleston leaked
over 7000 gallons of the toxic chemical – 4-methycyclohexanemethanol (MCHM) – into the Elk
River. Freedom Industries’ tanks were located on the banks of the river. The Elk River provided
drinking water to around 300,000 residents in nine counites of the West Virginia. After the
incident, hundreds of residents in Charleston and other West Virginia suffered from their
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contaminated drinking water and illness (e.g., nausea, burned skin and eyes, vomiting, rashes).
The chemical pollution incidents pose a public health threat, especially, to those living in poor
communities and communities of color in Charleston.
In addition, agriculture is the largest water user in the United States, and many
agricultural communities often contaminate waterways because of intensive agriculture and
livestock production (Schaider et al., 2019). Even though federal water policy supports largescale agriculture for local water resources such as dam construction for irrigation, it does not
allocate enough money to improve safe drinking water to small systems in the same agricultural
areas. Several studies indicate that financial assistance for water infrastructure and technological
skills in a response to the agricultural contamination of source waters are not equally distributed
across community water systems (Balazs et al., 2011; Cory and Rahman, 2009; Pilley et al.,
2009). Originally, federal water subsides may support for a social purpose; however, much of the
subsidies have been given to large-scale agriculture, instead of providing the benefits equally to
small family farmers (Reisner, 1993). For example, California plants communities obtain
federally subsidized irrigation water piped from hundreds of miles away, but poor households
near the area cannot use their drinking water due to agricultural pollutions (Scott, 2010).
Although much of water subsides go to large-scale farming, the agricultural businesses may
disregard environmental harms (e.g., contaminated rivers, streams, and drinking water wells)
caused by their industrial agricultural practices (Kimbrell, 2002; Scott, 2010).

Drinking Water Injustice Framework
The scope and nature of the drinking water-related challenges is complicated.
Threats to drinking water safety come from contaminated water resources produced by industrial
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activities, unregulated pollutants in drinking water, aged infrastructure, and a bureaucratic
culture of governance and management. However, the exposure to contaminated drinking water
is not equally distributed, but as environmental justice research indicates, there are patterns of
differential victimization related to the water problem.
This section focuses on why drinking water injustice exists with the politicaleconomic perspective. The current condition of drinking water system in the United States has
been historically affected by political-economic forces related to racial discrimination, a profitoriented water policy and management, and lack of inclusive governance (Contorno, Sarango,
and Harlan, 2018).

Legacies of Racial Discrimination
Larger structural processes, such as zoning practices, shape residential housing and
industrial facility sites. One example is the zoning practice, which is primarily to protect public
health, safety, and welfare of the people through the land-use regulation (Manntay, 2002). The
zoning practice provides support for the segregation of land uses such as residential, commercial,
and industrial place. Many municipalities in metropolitan regions, however, use the zoning
practice to protect their political and economic self-interest and increase their property values
(Wilson et al, 2008). The exclusionary zoning practices contribute to unequal developments
within spatial areas limiting access of all residents to valued economic, social, and ecological
resources (Lynch, 2016; Taylor, 2014; Wilson et al., 2008). As Lynch (2016) indicates, the
geographic organization of the political economic power affects the distribution of valued
resources across communities. That is, communities that have the political economic power
acquire advantages (e.g., healthy environment, better medical care, better quality of schools and
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employments) over communities where such power is absent or limited. The exclusionary zoning
practice is the way to benefit advantaged communities and disregard the needs and concerns of
disadvantaged communities (Wilson et al., 2008).
EJ research has demonstrated the impacts of the discriminatory urban planning on
minority and low-income communities. Decades of the exclusionary zoning practices indirectly
promote residential segregation and manipulate the racial composition of a community (Taylor,
2014). Minorities, thus, were forced to live in certain areas of cities: Poor communities and
communities of color are more likely to be found near noxious land uses such as manufacturing
zones, waste transfer stations, wastewater treatment plants, and energy production facilities than
white residential areas (Maantay, 2002).
Discriminatory urban planning is also responsible for drinking water injustice. According
to the EPA’s 2016 Drinking Water Action Plan, aging infrastructure and underinvestment in
drinking water are growing challenges that pose serious risk to public health. As mentioned
before (see the chapter 2), the drinking water infrastructure in the U.S was largely built in three
great construction eras: The late nineteenth century, the 1920s and the post-World War Ⅱ
(Siegel, 2019). The aging infrastructure and its related problems are universal concerns (e.g.,
lead contamination in drinking water). Minorities communities, however, are more exposed to
the burdens of associated with the aging water infrastructure, because they face institutional
barriers due to local planning and zoning practices. That is, a lack of a tax base and decades of
disinvestment for minorities communities resulted in inferior water infrastructure and made it
difficult for the water service utilities to keep up with technological innovations, while wealthier,
white communities keep attracting more resource for the investment (Balaz and Ray, 2014;
Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019; Schaider et al., 2019). Intentionally or unintentionally,
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minorities have been targeted for hazardous polluting facilities such as waste disposal,
manufacturing, or gas drilling that may also deteriorate the local water infrastructure (Contorno,
Sarango and Harlan, 2018).
Thus, uneven development of communities in the U.S in response to urban policy (e.g.,
exclusionary zoning practice) have led to unequal distribution of ecological disadvantage, and
the adverse outcomes constitute forms of drinking water injustice. Drawing from these
literatures, community water systems serving communities of color are more likely to commit
more violations of safe drinking water acts, due to racialized urban planning that contributed to
unequal distribution of water infrastructure and fewer resources to keep new treatment
technology.

Barrier to Adequate Infrastructure for the Poor
In addition to racialized urban planning, water has been managed by a business model
that seems to constitute a ‘profit over people’ approach – which is another cause of water
inequity (Contorno, Sarango and Harlan, 2018: p. 12). Since the Safe Drinking Water Act was
introduced in 1970, Congress gave responsibilities to “the governance triangle” including the
EPA, the States, and the local water utilities (Siegel, 2019). The community water utilities or the
local municipal water providers have obligation to meet all of the EPA’s regulations. The
utilities are required to monitor the local water source to find whether there are contaminants
above the permitted level. Once the pollutants are found in drinking water, the utilities are
obliged to report the violations and to neutralize or remove them. These obligations imposed on
the water utilities and local governments need local expenditures, although the federal
government agree to cover some portion of the local expense under the Safe Drinking Water Act
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(Siegel, 2019). In fact, the Safe Drinking Water Act have brought many obligations and financial
burdens for municipalities and local water utilities, “with nothing in return but the intangible
value of cleaner, safer water for the public” (Siegel, 2019: p. 36).
Based on the ‘profit-over people’ policy, there is, however, a misalignment
between the better health outcomes and the profit of water utilities. Specifically, the utilities
provide water that is “good enough” at the lowest cost possible, while regulations for the public
health increase expenses by installing new equipment or technology (Sigel, 2019: 37). Many
utilities and local governments tend to delay maintaining or replacing the ground old pipes,
simply because of financial burden.
Finding money for infrastructure investment is challenging so that municipal officials are
eager to save the cost of regulating containment in water at the local utilities, instead of
providing high-quality drinking water through investment on system improvements (Siegel,
2019). Not only is it expensive, but also it takes years to complete a full upgrade. The water
pipes are underground and largely invisible so that it is easy to overlook about them. As around
85% of the American water utilities are connected to municipal governments, municipal
planning about water infrastructure is often influenced by the profit-driven water industry, rather
than by the purpose of offering equitable distribution of clean water service (Contorno, Sarango
and Harlan, 2018). Thus, water infrastructure does not take a top priority for the residents.
The most influential organization in the drinking water industry is the American
Water Works Association, or AWWA. The origin purpose of AWWA is to help manage drinking
water utilities for the public good. However, the organization’s decisions regarding key policies
in drinking water are affected by the economic interests of drinking water utilities. Siegel (2019),
the author of ‘Troubled Water”, pointed out that based on interviews with AWWA executives,

54

the organization constantly tries to work in support of the goals of water utilities to keep costs
down by reducing the task that comes with regulation of contaminants. The AWWA’s CEO said,
“The idea of an absolute standard of trying to achieve purity of water is not as simple as
it sounds. Utilities strive for better, but there are complications.” (Siegel, 2019: p. 161).
As such, the AWWA tends to follow “the process of balancing benefit and cost” as the
best strategy to manage drinking water. The AWWA has an institutional power that can halt or
delay government regulations that would create new costs for utilities.
Consequently, as Siegel (2019) stated, “the water utilities end up delivering that ‘good
enough’ water, with ‘good’ being defined by what is minimally demanded by the EPA and its
state counterparts… Utilities would have an incentive to have the threshold for acceptable
contamination set as high as possible, thereby making the utility’s treatment costs as low as
possible” (p. 37). The containment risk standards are established by the process of balancing
benefit and cost to protect water utilities from financial burden. Given the economic cost of the
regulation, water utilities receive minimal enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act
(Contorno, Sarango and Harlan, 2018; Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019; Siegel, 2019).
Community water utilities are generally funded and built at a local level, with
some federal funding. According to the report of the National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), the fund for the water infrastructure improvement is about $19 billion in the Drinking
Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) from 1998 to 2016, which has translated to over $32.5
billion in the DWSRF to water system improvement projects across the nation. However, even
with the congressional funds for the water utilities to maintain the drinking water safety, such
funding is not enough to meet states and cities’ needs, especially in the type of loans and grants
for infrastructure construction (Laufenberg, 1998; Vanderwarker, 2012). Municipalities are
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under pressure to keep up with the millions of dollars needed to restore deteriorating pipes,
pumps, hydrants, meters and other systems (Chicago Tribute, 2017).
Under the market logic circumstance, the funding for infrastructure investments and
technological and managerial capacity is often inequitable for low-income water systems
(Vanderwarker, 2012). Economically disadvantaged communities are facing difficulties
accessing water financing and have insufficient scale of funding to maintain a modern drinking
water system, while wealthier communities take the priority of the funding for infrastructure
improvements because they are able to bring perceived return on investment (Contorno, Sarango
and Harlan, 2018).
Most economically disadvantaged communities suffer from declining and low-income
populations, and absence of a strong tax base. Even when these communities can obtain grants
and loans, they face a large cost burden of installing and operating a new treatment system
because of the relatively small number of people who can afford to share the cost. Poor
communities not only face difficulties for replacement of inferior water infrastructure, but also
tend to have limited managerial capacity needed to support sufficient training and qualified water
system operators. They suffer from both internal issues (e.g., inability to increase rates for
customers) and external issues (e.g., capability to apply loans) (Schaider et al., 2019).
Lack of access to the water funding in poor communities, in some cases, results in higher
water fees. According to 2017 the Chicago Tribune’s report25 on drinking water in Chicago and
its suburbs, poor communities and majority black-communities paid more for water than the
white and wealthy ones. Many black communities and/or poor towns have declining populations,
which lead residents left behind to bear the cost of repair or replacement. These communities

25

See, https://graphics.chicagotribune.com/news/lake-michigan-drinking-water-rates/loss.html
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often face aged water mains that repeatedly leak or break that increase their water fee. Without
sufficient funds to replace the inferior infrastructure, the black communities and poor
populations confront the cost of lost water in their water bill.

Against Exclusive Institutions: Civic Engagement
No one who is working in water management and regulation is trying to provide poor
quality water. The drinking water institutions, however, tend to have “a bureaucratic and
technical culture, leading decision-making processes to be exclusive from the public (Contorno,
Sarango and Harlan, 2018: p. v). Citizens should become aware of the exclusionary decisionmaking process of water management and collectively demand political leaders or participate
directly in local decision making to ensure the access to safe and clean drinking water (Fedinick,
Taylor, and Roberts, 2019). The Flint water crisis is the exemplary case that emphasizes the
importance of civic engagement in their local water system. In Flint, a state-chosen emergency
management organization decided to apply a more corrosive water source into inferior water
systems without adequate corrosion control. Subsequently, the government officials did not
immediately respond to the change in drinking water source (Davis et al., 2016). The crisis
identifies problems that during the process, water/environmental institutions failed to include
their community residents in the decision-making process. Exclusive operations of government
and the local water utilities resulted in health threat to the community, which is empirically
proved by one research that there is higher percentage of elevated lead blood level among
children associated with the Flint drinking water crisis as compared to those living other areas
(Hanna-Attisha et al., 2016).
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Not every community has the resources to react and interact in response to
environmentally sensitive situations (White, 2003). As communities are more aware of real and
potential environmental risk, they tend to call for more response by public health agencies and
organizations (Bogdonoff, Cooper-McDermott, and Foscue, 2003). One of such political
participations to environmental risk is “Not-In-My-Back-Yard” (NIMBY) reaction. The NIMBY
political response usually occurs in economically and politically affluent populations. That is,
resources for NIMBY politics and reaction come from knowledge, time, and money (White,
2003).
However, the community capacity for such collective reaction and resistance against
environmental risks is not perfectly attributable to socioeconomic status (Zahran, Hastings, and
Brody, 2008). While political power and capacity largely depend on residential compositions,
one cannot assume demographic factors (i.e., race/ethnicity, income, and education) level alone
determine residential ability for collective action aimed at improving their circumstances (Letki,
2018). Cable and Cable (1995), for example, have demonstrated that even low-income people of
color can mobilize effectively to resist the removal of industrial hazards, when they are equipped
with a high level of civic engagement that is acquired from voluntarism and community-based
organizations. Zahran, Hastings, and Brody (2008) also discovered the association between
nonprofit organizations in a census tract as a measure of civic vitality and sitting of hazardous
waste facilities. Regardless of economic status and race, the toxic waste facilities are less likely
to be placed in areas with higher than average civic vitality. Hamilton (1995) found that the
higher voter turnout, the lower likelihood of exposure to toxic releases emitted by hazardous
facilities. Even though race and income played crucial roles in sitting decisions of waste
facilities, voter turnout as a measure of the potential for collective action reduced the possibility
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of pollution output of facilities. That is, civic political reaction to environmental risks is partially
independent of community demographic composition (Zahran, Hastings and Brody, 2008: p.
184).
The term of “civic engagement” is collective behaviors aimed for resolving issues of
public concern through many forms such as volunteer work, nongovernment organizations, and
electoral participation (Zukin et al., 2006). Sampson (2017) emphasizes the role of civic
engagement in pursuit of sustainable urban ecosystems. Active citizen participation in
community-based organizations enhances shared expectations and trust to collectively address
the environmental concerns (Sampson, 2017). The density of nonprofit organizations, collective
citizen participation and network connectivity among community organizations (e.g., school, law
enforcement, and business) are also associated with community efficacy and health (Sampson,
2012). Ehrlich (2000) also defines civic engagement as collective efforts towards “making a
difference in the civic life of our communities and developing the combination of knowledge,
skills, values, and motivation to make that difference. It means promoting the quality of life in a
community, through both political and non-political processes” (p. vi).
Levine (2016) found that nonprofit community-based organizations that are strongly
associated with civic engagement superseded elected politicians as the legitimate representative
of poor minority communities for their infrastructure development. That is, leaders of nonprofit
community-based organizations are legitimately treated as the preferred representatives of their
community’s interest. Nonprofit community-based organizations play critical roles in fulfilling
public social provision and advocating for resources on behalf of disadvantaged communities.
According to Siegel (2019), in communities across the U.S., small nonprofit
organizations operate to improve access to safe drinking water for local people. Most of these
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organizations need fundraising skills, financial support, and professional staffs. However, these
gaps may be made up with special motivation: “The people whose drinking water is at risk are
often family members, neighbors, and friends” (p. 203). One example is the Environmental
Justice Health Alliance, which is serving politically powerless communities to help them develop
the capacity to demand safe drinking water, cleaner air and removal of industrial hazards. The
Crow Environmental Health Streeting Committee was also established to work for identifying
and fixing drinking water problems on the Native American tribes’ reservation. Nonprofit
community organizations help less-empowered residents to improve capacity to demand the
implementation of protective regulations for safe drinking water (Siegel, 2019). Although
bureaucrats in local water management agencies tend to overlook a voice from economically
disadvantaged communities in decision-making processes (Contorno, Sarango and Harlan,
2018), communities with greater participation volunteer associations (e.g., volunteer water
supervision organizations) will have more influence over decision-making process of their local
water system and ensure good quality water (Sigel, 2019).

Summary
Safe and clean drinking water must be equally provided for all the people regardless of
race, ethnicity, and class (White, 2008). Based on prior studies, however, communities that are
already socially and politically marginalized are more vulnerable to drinking water related
problems (Lauren, Sarango and Harlan, 2018; Schaider et al., 2019; Siegel, 2019; Switzer and
Teodoro, 2017; Vnaderwarker, 2012). This study pays attention to the issue of environmental
crime/justice that examines whether the compositions – racial/ethnic, poverty, and political
capacity/civic engagement - of a community affect the probability of residents’ exposure to
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contaminated drinking water. Generally, criminologists have had little to say about these issues
(Brisman et al., 2017), so that drinking water injustice deserves an attention to be theoretically
and empirically discussed in green criminology. This study contributes to the way in identifying
how race, money, and political power shape the distribution of contaminated drinking water as
the environmental harm. Based on the previous research, next chapter details the methodology
employed for this study.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
METHODOLOGY

This study assesses violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)26
committed by a community water system as the unit of analysis within the political-economic
context. Community water systems, as a kind of public water systems, serve at least 15 service
networks or 25 or more customers, and are subject to the regulatory standards. Reportedly, 96%
of the U.S population are served by community water systems (VanDerslice, 2011).
In this study, violations and characteristics of community water systems that serve over
500 people are collected from the EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS)
between 2016 and 2018, because very small systems (serving fewer than 500 people) are more
likely to report violations of the SDWA inadequately (Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2017; Rubin, 2013).
The data set in this study contains 21,845 community water systems (serving more than 500
residents) of the total 52,100 in the nation27.
Chapter four indicates the methodology used for this study. To begin, the associations to
be tested and hypotheses statements are mentioned. The conceptualization and operationalization

26

The SDWA was enacted in 1974 to authorize the EPA to regulate drinking water quality. The EPA sets national
health standard to protect drinking water at the federal level. States are primarily responsible for regulating public
water systems to meet adherence with the standards. When the water systems fail to ensure an EPA-set drinking
water standard, drinking water violation can be reported. The EPA regularly collected data on drinking water
violations and publicly provide the information through the SDWIS (Siegel, 2019).
27
The number of public water system in the US is approximately 155,693 in the US. Of the public water system,
52,100 (33.5%) are community water systems and 103,583 (66.5%) are non-community systems, including transient
systems and non-transient systems (EPA, 2008).
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of independent, dependent, and control variables follow. And then, details on the analytic
method are provided.

Research Questions & Hypotheses
Spatial Clusters of SDWA Violations
H1: SDWA violations are distributed non-randomly across geographic locations,
presenting spatial clusters (hot spot locations of violations).
First hypothesis is to assess whether health-based violations of SDWA are randomly
distributed across the nation. Prior literature suggests that while the United States has good
drinking water quality overall, drinking water systems have faced several challenges such as
aged water pipes. However, poor communities of color take disproportionate burden of the
concern, and they are highly exposed to poor quality of drinking water across the United States
due to legacy of segregation and unequal investment on water infrastructure (Allaire, Wu, and
Lall, 2017; Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018; Vanderwarker, 2012). To understand how
drinking water inequities are shaped by the political-economic perspective, it is necessary to
empirically identify the presence of spatial clusters of SDWA violations across geographic
locations.
The first step in the spatial analysis is to test null hypothesis 1 – spatial randomness of
SDWA violations. Assuming that spatial randomness is rejected, SDWA violations is not
randomly distributed across the nation, suggesting spatial clusters of the violations – counties
with high frequency of the violations are likely to be surrounded by one another with high
neighbors.
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Relationship between SDWA Violations and Community Characteristics
This study is designed to address the research question: Is there a relationship between
SDWA violation and community characteristics? Regarding this research question, five
hypotheses are explicated:
H2: As percentage of Hispanic residents in a community increases, the number of healthbased violation of the SDWA in a water system serving the community also increases.
H3: As percentage of Blacks residents in a community increases, the number of healthbased violation of the SDWA in a water system serving the community also increases.
H4: As poverty rate in a community increases, the number of health-based violation of
the SDWA in a water system serving the community also increases.
H5: As proportion of nonprofit community organization in a community decreases, the
number of health-based violation of the SDWA in a water system serving the community
increases.
H6: As average of voting rate in a community decreases, the number of health-based
violation of the SDWA in a water system serving the community increases.
These five hypotheses are informed by political economic approach and
environmental justice literature and race. With respect to race and ethnicity, because previous
research has identified there are more threats to drinking water safety (e.g., exclusionary zoning
practice, sitting of hazardous polluting facilities on minority areas, and underfunded water
infrastructure) in communities of color (Balaz and Ray, 2014; Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan,
2018; Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019; Schaider et al., 2019), hypotheses 2 and 3 anticipate
higher rates of drinking water act violations in predominately black and Hispanic communities
than other communities.
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Along with racial discrimination in zoning and urban construction, the profit-oriented
policy on drinking water gives a series of barriers for poor communities (Contorno, Sarango, and
Harlan, 2018; Siegel, 2019; Vanderwarker, 2012). Wealthier communities are prioritized for
infrastructure improvements, where there is an expected return on investment. Community water
systems serving poor communities are more likely to commit drinking water quality violations
than those for wealthy communities because of insufficient infrastructure investment (Copeland,
2010). Thus, hypothesis 4 anticipates a higher rate of drinking water act violations in poor
communities compared to other communities.
Hypothesis 5 and 6 estimates whether communities with lower levels of civic capacity
have less health-based violations because civically organized communities are more likely to
have political influence over decision-making process in local policies and give political
mobilization to resist environmentally unfavorable policies (Hamilton, 1993, 1995; Zahran,
Hastings and Brody, 2008).
Based on prior research, resources for civic capacity are measured by density of nonprofit
community-based organizations and voter turnout (Cable and Cable, 1995; Hamilton, 1993;
1995; Hird and Reese, 1998; Pellow, 2004; Levine, 2016; Konisky, 2009). Those communities
with higher level of civic engagement are more likely to live in areas with lower environmental
risks (Konisky and Schario, 2010). By examining hypotheses 5 and 6, it is expected that
communities with higher proportion of nonprofit organizations and higher voting rate as the
potential for civic engagement have lower rate of the drinking water regulation violations.
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Relationship between Noncompliance and Community Characteristics
This study also addressed related questions regarding the length of SDWA violation
status. For example, if a relationship between drinking water violation and socioeconomic
characteristics of a community emerges, the relationship between the length of noncompliance
with the Safe Drinking Water Act and community characteristics is also tenable. Drawing on
previous research, it is predicted that:
H7: As percentage of Hispanic residents in a community increases, the average length of
noncompliance per a community water system serving the community is also longer.
H8: As percentage of Blacks residents in a community increases, the average length of
noncompliance per a community water system serving the community is also longer.
H9: As poverty rate in a community increases, the average length of noncompliance per
a community water system serving the community is also longer.
H10: As proportion of nonprofit community organization in a community decreases, the
average length of noncompliance per a community water system serving the community is
also longer.
H11: As average of voting rate in a community decreases, the average length of
noncompliance per a community water system serving the community is also longer.
Hypotheses 7 and 8 consider the relationship between the average length of
noncompliance and racial/ethnic vulnerability with respect to the environmental justice
perspective. With previous research based on the political economic perspective (Lynch 2016),
drinking water systems serving minority communities tend to have long-term noncompliance
because lack of tax base and decades of disinvestment for these communities lead to inferior
water infrastructure and made it difficult for the utilities to be equipped with a technological

66

upgrade. Under the structural barrier communities of color face, violations remained uncorrected
longer (see also Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019).
Hypothesis 9 explores whether the water utilities serving poor communities tend to spend
more time out of compliance with the law. Because water infrastructure plans are often
influenced by the profit-oriented policy, access to the water funds is difficult for low-income
community water systems. In addition, utilities or local governments located in poor
communities tend to delay maintaining or fixing the aging water pipes due to financial burdens
(Siegel, 2019). Poor community’s water systems may have fewer resources to keep new
treatment technology in response to the drinking water contamination. Based on the background,
hypothesis 9 anticipates long-term noncompliance of the water utility serving poor communities.
Hypotheses 10 and 11 test whether communities with lower amount of civic engagement
are associated with slower enforcement actions of water systems. As the previous studies
(Contorno, Sarango, and Harlan, 2018; Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019) indicated, civic
engagement may give environmental pressure on out-of-compliance water systems to comply the
regulations quickly, delivering good quality of drinking water to the residents. That is,
widespread participation in community-based organization and collective action has a protective
effect against inadequate enforcement of SDWA. In other words, when communities have the
least amount of civic participation as measured by proportion of nonprofit organization and
voting rate, they are also more likely to face slower and inadequate enforcements of water
systems.
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Measures and Variables
Dependent Variables
1) Number of Health-based Violations of the Safe Drinking Water Acts
The first dependent variable in this analysis is the number of health-based violations of
the Safe Drinking Water Acts (SDWA) by each community water system between 2016 and
2018. The data in drinking water quality violation are based on self-reported information of
community water systems submitted by primary agencies to EPA.
The Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS) federal report search website28
provides the SDWA violation data. SDWIS is a database managed by EPA to help states to
protect public health, which is generally used for enforcement and compliance. The SDWIS
report includes the violation data per community water system that are grouped into the three
categories such as 1) health-based violations, 2) monitoring and reporting violations, and 3) other
violations.
Under the SDWA, the National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWR) have
been set to protect public health by reducing the levels of contaminants in drinking water, which
specify legally enforceable standards and treatment techniques that apply to community water
systems.29

See EPA, “Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS) Federal Reporting Services,”
https://www.epa.gov/ground-water-and-drinking-water/safe-drinking-water-information-system-sdwis-federalreporting.
29
The NPDWR regulates various types of contaminants in drinking water such as microorganisms, disinfectants,
disinfectants, disinfection byproducts, inorganic chemicals, organic chemicals, and radionuclides (see detailed
information by EPA, “National Primary Drinking Water Regulation Table,” https://www.epa.gov/ground-water-anddrinking-water/national-primary-drinking-water-regulation-table).
28
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The health-based violation of SDWA data includes three types of violations30 :
(1) Maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) violations: exceedances of the maximum
containment levels – the highest level of contaminant allowed in drinking water.
(2) Maximum residual disinfectant levels (MRDLs) violations: exceedances of the
maximum residual disinfectant levels – the highest level of disinfectants allowed in drinking
water.
(3) Treatment technique (TT) requirement violations: failing certain processes intended to
reduce the level of a contaminant in drinking water.
In this study, the health-based violation data was limited to community water systems
(above 500 customers) that are in active during 2016 and 2018. The data was downloaded from
2019 quarter 1 dataset of the SDWIS. The number of SDWA violations was measured by the
total number of valid value (as “yes” for the binary “Is Health-Based” field) indicated by each
water system, when it reported to violate at least one among MCLs, MRDLs, and TT types
during January 1. 2016 to December 31. 2018.
2) Length of Noncompliance
The second dependent variable in this study is the length of time out of
compliance per community water system between 2016 and 2018. The term of “Out of
Compliance” means community water systems are currently in violation of one or more of the
SDWA31. Generally, SDWA enforcement actions for out-of-compliance water systems include
the primary agency’s informal responses (e.g., warning letters, visiting) for a first-time violation
– and its formal responses (e.g., citations, administrative orders with or without penalties, and

See EPA, “SDWA Data Download Summary and Data Elementary Dictionary,” https://echo.epa.gov/tools/datadownloads/sdwa-download-summary
31
See EPA, “SDWA Data Download Summary and Data Elementary Dictionary,” https://echo.epa.gov/tools/datadownloads/sdwa-download-summary.
30
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filing criminal charges) 32, if a violation continues or repeats. SDWIS provides “SDWA
compliance status” data, which are quarterly recorded for types of SDWA violation and its
enforcement actions including both informal and formal reactions.
In this study, the SDWA compliance status data was limited to community water
systems that was active between the 2015 quarter 4 and the 2019 quarter 1. The cases were not
included in the data set if noncompliance status was recorded before the start date of the study
period (January 1, 2016). For cases that the compliance status dates were past the end date of the
study period (December 31, 2018), were excluded from the study. The length of noncompliance
was determined by the total period date when community water systems have “returned to
compliance” since a specified violation date and hence met the requirements of the SDWA,
during January 1. 2016 to December 31. 2018. Limiting the data in this way may create some
bias in the cases included in the analysis.

Independent Variables
SDWIS also provides county-level locations served by each community water system.
Since the demographics information about customers of a community water system is not
publicly available, counties served by each system can be matched with the geographic names in
the U.S Census Bureau American Community Survey to find possible association between
SDWA violations and community characteristics. That is, US Census demographic data for a
county are linked to the violation data from community water systems serving the region. The
community demographics used in this analysis are county-level US census variables, which were
obtained from the American Community Survey data in the year of 2016.

32

See EPA, “Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Resources and FAQs”, https://echo.epa.gov/help/sdwa-faqs#Q2
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This study examines how three dimensions of community characteristics - 1) racial/ethnic
proportion, 2) poverty, 3) civic engagement. Each is hypothesized to be associated with drinking
water system’s violations of the SDWA. By doing so, it makes at least three contributions to the
previous studies as indicated below.
First, consistent with the previous literature (Contorno et al., 2018; Schaider et al., 2019;
Vanderwarker, 2012), communities of color are more likely be exposed to the SDWA violations
due to decades of racialized urban planning that contributed to unequal distribution of water
infrastructure that exist across communities currently. The variables used to examine the
hypothesis are (1) the proportion of Black residents in a county and (2) the proportion of
Hispanic residents in a county by using the 2012-2016 American Community Survey data33, 5year estimates (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census 2016).
Second, this study analyzes the logic of economics that are hypothesized to lead to
drinking water injustice. Given the inequitable distribution of fund for water systems, poor
communities are associated with higher number of drinking water violations and slower response
to compliance with the law. A measure of “the percentage of families and people whose income
past 12 months is below the poverty rate” is used to find the economically disadvantaged effect.
The data comes from the American Community Survey data in 2012-2016, 5-year estimates.
Lastly, this study explores the hypothesis that civic engagement is independently
associated with drinking water violations. Communities with the least amount of civic
engagement are more likely to have higher rate of violation and long-term of incompliance. To
examine these hypotheses, based on previous studies, I employ two measures of resources for
civic engagement: 1) non-profit organizations proportion, and 2) average voting rate (2012 and

33

The date was accessed from https://www.census.gov/acs/www/data/data-tables-and-tools/data-profiles/2016/.
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2016) in the presidential election (Levine, 2016; Sampson, 2017; Zahran, Hastings and Brody,
2008). A measure of registered non-religious non-profit organization per 1,000 is created using
the National Center of Charitable Statistics per county from 2015 Business Master File of Inter
Revenue Service34, divided by 2015 American Community Survey population estimates35. The
voting rate data36 is obtained from Election Administration and Voting Survey implemented by
the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

Control Variables
1) Community Drinking Water System Characteristics
Characteristics of community water systems are also associated with SDWA violations
(Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2017; Schaier et al., 2019). Water system characteristics of interest in this
analysis include type of source water (ground or surface) and ownership type (private or public)
and the utility size.
The utility size categories are defined based on population serve by a given system. In
this study, three categories of the utility size are defined by the EPA designations: small utilities
(501-3300 people), medium (3,301-10,000), and large (more than 10,000). These data come from
the EPA’s SDWIS between 2016 and 2018.

34

The IRS data is accessed at the Urban Institute, NCCS Data Archive. Retrieved from https://nccsdata.urban.org/data.php?ds=bmf.
35
See U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2015: Volunteer Supplement. Retrieved from
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/36411.
36
For the voting rates, see U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey:
A Summary of Key Findings, Retrieved from
https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/2012ElectionAdministrationandVoterSurvey.pdf.; U.S. Election Assistance
Commission, The Election Administration and Voting Survey: 2016 Comprehensive Report. Retrieved from
https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/2016_EAVS_Comprehensive_Report.pdf.

72

2) Urbanization
Previous studies indicate that rural areas and less urbanized areas are related to a higher
likelihood of violations (Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2017; Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019;
Siegel, 2019). Community drinking water systems in rural areas are more likely to be impacted
by financial difficulty and have less capacity to meet the water quality regulations because of
declining residents and lower income.
There are multidimensional concepts for a rural place. Previous literature employs many
measures to distinguish rural from urban areas, based on such as population density, geographic
isolation, and small population size threshold (Cromartie and Bucholtz, 2008). This study also
employs four rural/urban controls into the equation.
First, the proportion of county residents residing in rural areas is included in this analysis.
The Census Bureau does not exactly define “rural”, but “rural areas include all geographic areas
that are not classified as urban” (U.S Census Bureau, 2016)37. We obtain the proportion of
households in rural areas from the U.S. Census Bureau for each county (2010 estimates).
Second, this study creates a rural county “dummy” variable by using the Beale Code. The
Beale Code provides a rural-urban continuum indicator that categorizes counties by their degree
of urbanization and nearness to metropolitan areas, ranging from 0 to 9 (Butler and Beale, 1994).
The code of 0 means a county is placed in a central metropolitan area with at least one million
residents. The codes of 8 and 9 mean counties are completely rural or have fewer than 2,500
urban residents. To distinguish degree of rurality from urbanity in this study, the Beale Code is
reconstructed into two groups – “rural county” and “urban county”. The rural county group

37

The Census Bureau uses a definition based on population density and other measures of dense development when
defining urban areas. Since the urban/rural classification is built on blocks and tracts, a county’s population can be a
combination of urban and rural (The Census Bureau, 2016).
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includes the codes of 8 and 9, while the urban county group contains the codes 0 to 7. The Beale
Code date is obtained from the Economic Research Service, the Department of Agriculture.38
Third, as the Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB, 2014) adopted standard
for delineating “metropolitan (metro) counties” by the population size and “nonmetropolitan
(nonmetro) counties” by degree of urbanization and adjacency to a metro area/areas39, a metro
counties “dummy” (vs. nonmetro) variable is included in the analysis to control for urbanization
effect.
Forth, population density by county is included in the analysis. Population density
measured by persons per square mile can compare settlement intensity across county-level areas.
A county’s population density can be related to degree of urbanization. This study uses data from
the 2016 American Community Survey.
3) Built Environment Effect
Community’s built environment affects the quality of drinking water (Balazs and Ray,
2014). The built environment means human-modified spaces where people live, work, and
recreate. For example, farming is a part of the built environment (Balazs and Ray, 2014).
Agriculture uses the largest water in the nation and is one cause for water contamination (EPA,
2005; Vanderwarker, 2012). The farming practices (e.g., fertilizer use) may affect local water
resources such as the contamination of streams and drinking water wells even though farms
receive federal water subsidies (Siegel, 2019). Likewise, the human-modified spaces often affect
water quality.

See “Rural-Urban Continuum Codes.” Retrieved from https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-urbancontinuum-codes.aspx.
39
See “Metropolitan Area Designations by OMB: History, 2010 Standards, and Uses.” Retrieved from
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20140606_R42005_cc88d5c754b797d095e0880142d7c28aa739d871.pdf.
38
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Given the background, the 2015 County Typology Codes are used to control for the
effect of the built environment on drinking water quality. The 2015 County Typology Codes
classify all U.S. counties to diverse categories of economic dependence, such as farming and
mining40. The 2015 County Typology Codes provide dichotomous variables indicating that it is
classified as a farm-dependent county (coded 1), when farming accounted for 25% or more of the
county’s earnings or 16% or more of the employment averaged over 2010-2012. The miningdependent county indicator (coded 1) means 13% or more of the county’s earning or 8% or more
of the employment averaged over 2010-2012.
4) State and Region Effect
Previous literature suggests that agency enforcement decisions of environmental laws are
also affected by state politics (Lynch, Stretescky, and Burns, 2004; Scholz and Wang, 2006;
Konisky and Schario, 2010). Under the SDWA, the public water systems including community
water systems are supervised, within each state’s authority, to comply safe drinking water
standards.
To capture possible state political factor related to environmental enforcement, this study
contains the average League of Conservation Voters (LCV) voting scores for the state’s
delegation to the U.S House of Representatives to measure elite-level environmental attitudes,
during 2016 to 2018. The LCV provides their annual National Environmental Scorecard, which
presents the consensus of around 20 environmental and conservation organizations. The LCV’s
scorecard is used to rate members of Congress on environmental, public health, and energy
issues. The LCV’s scorecard is based on scale of 0 to 100, calculated by diving the number of

40

The 2015 County Typology Codes data come from Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. Retrieved from http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/county-typology-codes/documentation.aspx.
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pro-environmental votes cast by the total number of votes scored. 41 By including the average
LCV voting score, this study controls for the state political condition that may influence
community water system’s regulatory enforcement decisions.
To account for possible regional variation in both racial demographic patterns and
SDWA violence incidence, four regional indicator “dummy” variables (Northeast, South,
Midwest, and West) are also included.

Statistical Software and Methods
Data were analyzed using Stata 16 (StataCorp., 2019) and GeoDa (Anselin, Syabri, and
Kho, 2006). Bivariate and multivariate techniques was conducted by using Stata 16.
First, descriptive statistics was used to provide sample characteristics (e.g., means and
standard deviations) for each variable using Stata 16. Next, the Moran’s I statistic was applied to
identify spatial clusters of SDWA violations across the nation using GeoDa. The spatial weights
and the spatial lag variable creation were also performed using GeoDa.
After that, two regression models were applied to assess the effects of independent
variables on each dependent variable. To estimate the model for SDWA violations and
community characteristics, a zero-inflated negative binominal regression equation (ZINB) was
applied using Stata 16. Because SDWA violation can only have positive integer values, a linear
regression model is not suitable for count dependent variables (Long and Freese, 2001). If count
outcomes are analyzed using a linear regression model, it will cause heteroskedasticity issue that
affects the size of standard error estimates. To avoid the statistical problem, this study used the
ZINB that is designed for count dependent variables. The other reason is that the dependent

41

See the detailed information for the National Environmental Scorecard, https://scorecard.lcv.org.
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variable has large number of zeros – 86.2% of water systems reported a zero number of
violations during the given period. ZINB is specifically designed to respond to count dependent
outcomes that contain excess zeros (Long and Freese, 2001).
When the second dependent variable, the length of noncompliance, was assessed,
ordinary least squares regression was employed due to the continuous nature of the variable. As
the distribution of length of noncompliance had a skewed variable, it was transformed using the
natural log to have a more normalized data set (Allison, 1999). The detail explanation regarding
analytical methods used will be provided in the chapter five.

Limitations
There are limitations that need to be addressed. First, violation records from the EPA
Safe Drinking Water Information System are known to be underestimates of actual occurrence
(Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2017). The EPA has a system to allow small utilities to have exemptions
from testing and waivers for addressing contaminated water if they can prove they face the
necessary financial capacity to reduce the contaminated levels (Siegel, 2019). The threat of
contaminated water is not uncovered until after harm has happened. Therefore, the number of
health based safe drinking water act violations are likely to be much greater than reported in this
study.
Second, our analysis using county-level demographics is challenging for identifying
community characteristics served by each community water system. The most appropriate unit of
analysis in environmental justice studies are considerably debated (Liu, 2001; Lynch et al.,
2004); some studies prefer census tracts (Atlas, 2001; Stretesky and Hogan, 1998) while others
insist ZIP codes as approximate units of community characteristics (Lavelle and Coyle, 1992;
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Ringquist, 1998). Since community water systems are not required to gather demographic data
about customers, county-level demographics that systems directly provide water are available in
our study to find possible relationship between the water quality violations and community
characteristics. The demographics of the population served by the community water systems may
vary with available geographic units.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Chapter five provides the analysis results for this study. Before the results for the tests of
hypotheses are provided, preliminary analyses were conducted, and descriptive statistics of the
sample are also presented. After that, the results for the tests of hypotheses are discussed.

Preliminary Analyses
Descriptive Data
Descriptive data for all variables are provided in Table 2.42 The average number of Safe
Drinking Water Acts Violation (SDWA) per community water system between 2016 and 2018
was 0.6572. The mean proportion of Black and Hispanics served by those systems were 9.69%
and 11.6%, respectively. The mean poverty rate was 11.79% across the nation. The average
voting rate was 58.73%, and the mean proportion of non-profit organization per 1,000 by county
was 4.19.
With respect to ownership of community water system, 16.69% of the system were
privately owned, while 83.31% of the system were publicly owned (federal, state, or local).
Community water system size in the data includes 58.79% small systems (serves more than 500

42

The presented table for the variables is for the case of SDWA violation. The actual number of observations in the
analysis varies by the dependent variables. Descriptive statistics for the case of length of noncompliance are
provided in the appendix section.
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and less than 3,300 people), 22.06% medium systems (3,300-10,000 people), and 19.15% large
systems (>10,000 people).

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Study (n=21,845).
Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

SDWA violations

.657

3.099

.00

69

Proportion of Black

9.699

12.935

.00

86.20

Proportion of Hispanic

11.607

14.540

.00

99.00

Poverty rate

11.795

11.070

.870

44.320

Average of voting rate (2012&2016)

58.734

8.684

27.90

92.50

Proportion of nonprofit organization

4.169

2.022

.70

28.00

Ownership: private

.167

.373

.00

1.00

Ownership: public

.833

.373

.00

1.00

System size: small

.588

.492

.00

1.00

System size: medium

.221

.415

.00

1.00

System size: large

.192

.192

.00

1.00

Primary water source: surface

.380

.485

.00

1.00

Primary water source: ground

.620

.485

.00

1.00

County typology: farming

.068

.252

.00

1.00

County typology: mining

.072

.258

.00

1.00

Proportion of rural residents

42.897

30.834

.00

100

Metro county (metro=1, nonmetro=0)

.580

.494

.00

1.00

Rural County Group (rural=1, urban=0)

.079

.270

.00

1.00

Population density

417.015

919.396

.30

34127.00

37.53

24.457

.00
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Midwest

.264

.441

.00

1.00

West

.166

.372

.00

1.00

South

.476

.499

.00

1.00

Northeast

.093

.291

.00

1.00

State-level
League of Conservation Voters (LCV)
Region (dummy coded)
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With respect to water source, 38.03% of community water system served surface water to
people, while 61.97% of the system provided groundwater to consumers. Based on the county
typology, the proportion of the system serving in a farming and a mining dependent county was
6.8% and 7.2%, respectively. The average proportion of rural residents served by community
water system was 42.89%, while the percentage of water systems operating in metro counties
was 58%. When counties were categorized by “rural county group” and “urban county group”
based on the Beale Code, the proportion of water systems located in rural county group was
7.9%. The average population density (population per square mile of land area) served by
community water system was 417.01. The average environment attitude score at the state-level,
was 37.53. Finally, 47.6% of community water systems were in the South region, while 9.3% of
these were in the Northeast.

SDWA Violations by Contaminant Type
EPA sets the National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWR) to protect against
both naturally occurring substances and man-made contaminants found in tap water based on the
SDWA (EPA, 2004). The NPDWR covers several types of contaminants in drinking water that
pose threats to public health, such as disinfection & disinfection byproduct, inorganic chemical,
microorganism, radionuclides, and organic chemical.
To calculate numbers of SDWA violations by contaminant type, the health-based
violations of the SDWA were aggregated using the “Contaminant Name” section in the SDWIS
data from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2018. Based on the NPDWR, SDWA violations were
categorized and summed by five types of contaminants.
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Figure 3 indicates that there are 15,164 health-based violations of the SDWA by
contaminant types during the study period. Among the types, disinfection and disinfection
byproduct violations are the most prevalent; 9,928 occurred between 2016 and 2018. In drinking
water treatment process, disinfectants such as chlorine are added into water supply to neutralize
water-borne bacteria – Chlorine is the most widely used disinfectant chemical in the nation
(CDC, 2016). 43 However, chlorination of drinking causes different types of disinfection
byproducts that can harm human health such as increased cancer risk and miscarriages. Since
source water around the country have become widely polluted (Siegel, 2019), there is a great
concern regarding the formation of disinfection byproducts, especially when surface water
sources (e.g., rivers, lakes, and streams) are transported from treatment plants to the tap. The
surface water sources are likely to include organic substances that react with chlorine to produce
disinfection byproducts in the water treatment process. According to EPA’s report (2002), aging
water pipes are also likely to create additional form of disinfection byproducts such as corrosion
byproducts and sediment deposits.
Inorganic chemical violations were also prevalent; 2,138 occurred, during the study
period. Inorganic contaminants in water may be caused by human activities such as mining and
agriculture. Amounts above the Maximum Contaminants Levels (MCL) of inorganic chemicals
may cause negative effects on the kidneys, nervous system, circulatory systems, bones, or skin
(Fedinick, Taylor and Roberts, 2019).
There were 1, 951 microorganism violations during the study period. Microorganism are
related with various types of bacteria, viruses and protozoa that are categorized as pathogens.

43

See the detail information of Disinfection By-Products (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:
https://www.cdc.gov/safewater/chlorination-byproducts.html#five)
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Human and animal waste products are the main contributors to pathogens in water through
failing onsite wastewater systems, agricultural and urban runoff (Hoornbeek, 2011).
Next, 1,102 radionuclides violations were reported between 2016 and 2018.
Radionuclides, such as radium, polonium, radon, and uranium, come from naturally occurring
sources (e.g., soil, rock) and man-made substances (e.g., road construction materials, medical
treatments) (Fedinick, Taylor and Roberts, 2019).
Organic chemical violations were the least frequent form of violation, only 45 occurred
during the study period. Organic chemicals contain petroleum, grease, and many types of
chemicals used in manufacturing processes and agriculture in the form of pesticides and
insecticides (Hoornbeek, 2011).

Disinfection &
Disinfection byproduct

9928

Contaminant Type

Inorganic chemical

2138

Microorganism
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Radionuclides
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Organic chemical

45
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Figure 3. Number of SDWA Violations, 2016-2018, by Contaminant Type.
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SDWA Violations by Rule Name
The table 3 presents the number of SDWA violations categorized by rule name. To
consider the number of SDWA violations by rule name, the number of SDWA violations were
aggregated using the “Rule Code” data section in the data set. The total number of community
water systems with SDWA violations were also summed under each rule. Populations served by
individual water system with SDWA violations under each rule were summed to find the total
numbers of the people that are potentially affected by contaminated drinking water.
First, between January 2016 and December 2018, 15,164 health-based violations were
committed by 3,431 water systems among all the sample cases (N = 21,845). It is estimated that
74,012,899 residents were possibly exposed to unsafe drinking water provided by community
water systems with SDWA violations.
The most frequent violation is the Stage 2 Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts
Rule, which represented 9,334 violations by 1,505 water systems during the study period. The
Stage 2 Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts Rule44 is established to improve public health
protection by reducing exposure to microbial pathogens and disinfectants/disinfectants
byproducts, which are known to have potential health effects such as cancer and nervous system
dysfunction in infants (Fedinick, Taylor and Roberts, 2019).
The second most commonly reported violation involved violations of the Arsenic Rule;
1,218 occurred in 137 water systems. Arsenic is a one of the inorganic contaminants, which is
regulated under the 2001 updated arsenic standard by 2001, which lowered the contamination

44

For the detailed information, see https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/stage-1-and-stage-2-disinfectants-anddisinfection-byproducts-rules#rule-history.
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level to 10 parts per billion (ppb) from the existing standard of 50 ppb. 45 Chronic exposure to
arsenic is related to health effects such lung cancer, developmental defects, blindness, and skin
lesions (Cory and Rahman, 2008; Fedinick, Taylor and Roberts, 2019).
Next, both Radionuclides Rule and Total Coliform Rule are also commonly violated,
with 1,102 and 746 reported, respectively. EPA set the Radionuclides Final Rule in 200046 to
protect customers of community water systems from exposure to radionuclides in drinking water
which include contaminants such as radium, gross alpha, beta particles, and uranium. Elevated
level of radionuclides in drinking water can cause health problems such as cancer and kidney
malfunctions (Fedinick, Taylor and Roberts, 2019). Total Coliform Rule47 was set in 1989 to
regulate total coliform level in drinking water. Total Coliform contains many types of bacteria
that do not have a harmful impact on human health, but some types of bacteria (e.g., E. coli) can
cause gastrointestinal diseases such diarrhea, cramps, nausea, and vomiting (Allaire, Wu, and
Lall, 2018).

45

In 2001, the Arsenic Rule set lower level of arsenic in drinking water from the prior standard of 50 parts per
billion (ppb) to 10 ppb, to protect consumers from the effects of long-term exposure to arsenic; see the detailed
information - https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/chemical-contaminant-rules.
46
For the detailed information, see https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/radionuclides-rule.
47
The Total Coliform Rule (TCR) was set in 1989 to meet both a health goal (Maximum Contaminant Level Goal,
MCLG) and legal limits (Maximum Contaminants Levels, MCL). EPA regulated the MCLG for the total coliforms
at zero. (see, https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/revised-total-coliform-rule-and-total-coliform-rule).
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Table 3. Number of Health-Based Violations, 2016-2018, by Rule Name.
Number of
Violations

Number of
Systems with
Violations

Population
Served by
Systems with
Violations

15,164

3,431

74,012,899

Arsenic Rule

1218

137

597,864

Inorganic Chemicals

279

40

362,101

Lead and Copper Rule

247

161

2,130,812

Nitrates Rule

394

106

1,831,837

Microorganism Long-Term 1 Enhanced
Surface Water
Treatment Rule

486

195

4,863,867

Long-Term 2 Enhanced
Surface Water
Treatment Rule

218

44

13,814,548

Revised Total Coliform
Rule
Surface Water
Treatment Rule

210

187

2,511,774

291

149

3,444,803

Total Coliform Rule

746

521

9,848,116

Radionuclides

Radionuclides Rule

1102

150

770,770

Disinfections
&
Disinfections
byproduct

Stage 1 Disinfectants
and Disinfection
Byproducts Rule

594

221

1,470,503

Stage 2 Disinfectants
and Disinfection
Byproducts Rule

9334

1505

32,221,228

Synthetic Organic
Contaminants

13

6

65,704

Volatile Organic
Chemicals

32

9

78,972

Contaminants
Type

Rule Name

Total
Inorganic
chemical

Organic
chemical
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Spatial Distribution of SDWA Violations
The Figure 4 shows a spatial distribution of SDWA violations per community water
system in a county during the study period. There are 2,956 counties shown in the map,
excluding 129 counties that are excluded due to missing values.
As the map indicates, the frequency of drinking water quality violations varies across
geographic areas. Based on the standard deviation of SDWA violations per county during 2016
to 2018, there are 84 counites (2.8% of the total counties) as the high-prevalent-violation areas in
red, with 33.513 standard deviations above the average number of SDWA violations. Most of
these counties are found in the South and Southwest regions, including California, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana.
Next, 98 counties (3.3.%) were categorized as the less high prevalent violation areas in
orange. Many of them seem to be close to or surrounded by the counties in red – the most
prevalent violation areas, while the others are sparsely located in the Northeast region.
Considering the spatial distribution of SDWA violations shown in this map, South and
Southwest regions seem to have community water systems that report safe drinking water quality
violations frequently.
The next section is followed by hypothesis tests including spatial analysis of SDWA
violations, which will provide empirical evidence for spatial clusters (hot spots) of the drinking
water quality violation using spatial autocorrelation statistic. After that, regression analyses are
conducted, focusing on effects of community characteristics on the SDWA violation frequency
and the length of SDWA noncompliance.
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Figure 4. Spatial Distribution of SDWA Violations, 2016-2018.

Hypothesis Tests
Spatial Clusters of SDWA Violations
To test this first hypothesis, “SDWA violations are distributed non-randomly across
geographic locations, presenting spatial clusters (hot spot locations of violations)”, the spatial
distribution of SDWA violations across counties was analyzed via local spatial autocorrelation.
Spatial autocorrelation means a situation in which values on a variable of interest are
systematically associated with a geographic area (Anselin and Rey, 2014; Baller et al., 2001).
In this study, spatial autocorrelation is accessed by means of a global Moran’s I
statistic48. The first step in the analysis is to examine the null hypothesis of spatial randomness.

Moran’s I is the most commonly applied test statistic for spatial autocorrelation. The Moran’s I test is a
misspecification test that has power against a host of alternatives, including spatial error autocorrelation, residual
correlation caused by a spatial lag alternative, and even heteroskedasticity (Anselin and Rey, 2014).
48
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Specifically, the spatial null hypothesis states that: there is no spatial dependence related to a
given feature across a geographic location.
By estimating the spatial dependence and relative magnitude between a given
county and neighboring counties, spatial clustering of counties is identified. Values of the
Moran’s I range from -1 to +1. A significant and higher positive value of this statistic means
higher, positive spatial autocorrelation (i.e., similar values spatially clustered together), whereas
a significant and lower negative value means high negative spatial autocorrelation (values
clustered by dissimilar values). A value close to zero means no spatial clustering. Therefore, to
be a statistically significant spatial cluster of SDWA violations, a county includes high
prevalence of violations committed by its community water systems and would be surrounded by
other counties that include a high prevalence of violations. Counties are used as the geographic
unit of analysis.
Formally, Moran’s I is

where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is an element of a row-standardized spatial weight between county i and j, y is
the total number of SDWA violations per water system by county, and 𝑦̅ is the average SDWA
violence occurrence in the sample during the study period.
Among 3,085 counties, 129 counties are excluded in this analysis, due to missing values.
Thus, the total number of counties used in the estimate was 2,956. By examining the Moran’s I
statistic for SDWA violations between 2016 and 2018, the coefficient is 0.370 (see Figure 5).
The result was statistically significant at the 0.05 level49, which rejects the null hypothesis of

49

It is analyzed based on a permutation approach with 999 random permutations.

89

spatial randomness. In other words, the results indicate spatial clustering. It signifies spatial
autocorrelation in the distribution for the number of SDWA violations per community water
system in each county. Thus, the result suggests that the SDWA violation is not randomly
distributed across geographic locations and counties that have more prevalence of violation per
community water system tend to be significantly closer in proximity to one another.

Figure 5. Moran Scatter Plot of SDWA Violations, 2016-2018.

Although the Moran’s I statistic is a “global” statistic of spatial autocorrelation – that
means it concerns the complete data sets – it does not provide the pattern of the dependence or
specify the presence of clusters and spatial outliers (Baller et al, 2001; Ruther, 2013). To find
insights into spatial clusters for SDWA violations, a local indicator of spatial association (LISA),
so called the local Moran’s I statistic, can be applied. The local Moran’s I is a decomposition of
90

the global Moran’s I value into the contribution of each county. In addition, it allows
comparisons between the local Moran’s I values for each county, indicating spatial clusters of
high prevalence of the SDWA violation counties surrounded by counties that also have high
prevalence of the SDWA violation or low prevalence violation counties with other low violation
counties (Anselin, 1995).
A modified Moran scatterplot map is provided in Figure 6, which is a combination of the
information in a Moran scatterplot map and the significance of the local Moran’s I statistic50
(Anselin and Bao, 1997; Baller et al., 2001). This map indicates clusters of high prevalence of
the SDWA violation counties in red, and clusters of low prevalence of the SDWA violation
counties in blue (both positive spatial autocorrelation); counties with white are not part of
significant clusters. Counties with a high prevalence of SDWA violations surrounded with
counties with low prevalence, and the counties with low prevalence surrounded by counties with
high SDWA prevalence are regarded as non-clustered in this study.
As shown in Figure 6, the “High-High” clusters category is indicated as the clustering of
SDWA violation among 143 counties. Those counties are located in Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona,
New Mexico, Arkansas and California. The “Low-Low” category is found in the North-East
parts of the country: The total number of counties for LL clusters is 216.

50

Moran scatterplot map provides geographic locations with significant local indicator of spatial association (LISA)
and a color category for spatial association in the Moran scatterplot to which location pertains (Anselin and Bao,
1997).
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Figure 6. Spatial Clusters of SDWA Violations, 2016-2018.

Using the two different clusters categories (HH clusters and LL clusters), we can
compare the mean of independent variables (such as race/ethnicity, poverty, and civic
engagement) applied in this study using a two-independent sample t-test. As Table 4 indicates,
the mean proportion of Hispanics was greater in HH clusters compared to LL clusters (18.815%
vs. 5.855%, p < 0.001). while the mean proportion of Blacks between HH-and LL-clusters is not
statistically significant (p > 0.05). When the mean proportion of Whites between HH-and LLclusters is compared – even though this study does not include the White proportion variable –
the observed difference in mean proportion of Whites was smaller in HH clusters than LL
clusters (61.727% vs. 81.639, p < 0.001). indicating Whites are more likely to live in clusters
with lower levels of SDWA violations.
In addition, the observed differences in mean poverty rate between two groups is also
statistically significant: mean poverty rate in HH clusters is greater compared to LL clusters
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(19.621% vs. 16.329%, p < 0.001). The observed differences in the mean proportion of
registered non-profit organization and the mean voting rate are statistically significant between
HH clusters and LL clusters; the mean proportion of registered non-profit organization in HH
clusters (3.397% vs. 5.094%, p < 0.001) and the mean voting rate (51.513% vs. 60.755%, p <
0.001) in HH clusters are smaller compared to LL.

Table 4. Comparison of Variables between HH Clusters and LL Clusters.
Variables
% Black
% Hispanic
% White
% Poverty
% Nonprofit org.
% Voter turnout

HH
clusters

LL
clusters

(n=143)

(n=216)

9.825
18.815
61.727
19.621
3.397
51.513

8.958
5.855
81.639
16.329
5.094
60.755

Mean
difference

t Score

.866
12.959
-19.912
3.292
-1.697
-9.241

.588
7.683***
-10.223***
4.994***
-6.679***
-10.128***

*** p<.001

These results indicate that SDWA violations are not randomly distributed across counties
and the distribution/location of those clusters are associated with certain correlates. Spatial
clusters for violation were also found using the local Moran’s I statistic. That is, there are
violation hotspots or communities that experience a higher number of violations. In addition, it
was observed that counties that have a higher frequency of violations tend to be surrounded by
counties that also have a high frequency of violations. Spatial clusters of violations particularly
appear in Southwest region (i.e., Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, Arkansas and
California).
Even though the geographical hot spots of SDWA violations indicate a clustering of these
location, those counties comprise take a small proportion – only 4.6% among all counties.
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Despite their small number, these communities reflect the nation’s water challenges and other
inequities (see, Anderson, 2008; London et al., 2018). Some of them continue to confront lack of
basic infrastructure (e.g., sewage and wastewater disposal systems) as well as vital service (e.g.,
adequate law enforcement and fire protection). For example, in San Joaquin Valley, California,
disadvantaged unincorporated communities (i.e., poor communities located outside urban areas)
face water insecurity (Balazs et al., 2011; Durst, 2014). During 1999 and 2001, community water
systems serving larger proportion of Latinos and renters in the San Joaquin Valley were more
likely to provide nitrate-contaminated drinking water (Balazs et al., 2011). According to a 2018
report by the US Water Alliance, about 350,000 residents lack access to clean water in the San
Joaquin Valley. Poor communities of color in the area are disproportionately affected by
contaminated drinking water – the conditions the valley’s residents have faced are described as
‘Third World areas in a First World country’ in a report in the New York Times (Del Real, 2019),
and in academic studies (Anderson, 2008; London et al., 2018; Marsh et al., 2010).

Relationship between SDWA Violation and Community Characteristics
Result from the test of hypothesis 1 revealed that the health-based violation of SDWA is
more prevalent in some locations, which suggests SDWA violations are not randomly
distributed. Even though the bivariate results provide the presence of environmental inequity
across counties – for example, mean proportions of Hispanic and poverty are higher in the highhigh clusters of SDWA violation compared to low-low clusters – spatial differences in SDWA
violation occurrence, however, may be also affected by other factors such as source water
quality, water system’s ownership and size, urbanization, differences in state-level politics
(Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2018). The next hypothesis tests in this study were designed to discover
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the existence of vulnerability characteristics of communities and water systems in related to
violation incidence through zero-inflates negative counts model. The unit of analysis in this
model is the community water system.
Since the violation of SDWA can only take on positive integer values, a model for count
dependent variables is appropriate. A linear regression model can result in inefficient,
inconsistent, and biased estimates when models designed for count outcomes are analyzed (Long
and Freese, 2001). It can lead to heteroskedasticity that impacts the size of the standard error
estimates. That in turn is likely to result in bias in hypothesis statistics and confidence intervals
(Allison, 1998). To avoid this issue, it is safer to use analytic methods that are specifically
designed for count outcomes as Poisson regression (PRM), negative binomial regression
(NBRM), and variations of these models for zero-inflates counts (ZIP and ZINB).
In this study, the zero-inflated counts model (ZINB) fits the data best. The dataset in this
study indicates that the variance (s²=9.6085) greatly exceeded the means of SDWA violations
(M=0.6571), which suggests a possible violation of the property of the Poisson distribution (i.e.,
PRM). Poisson models assume that the means and variance are equal, referred to as
“equidispersion.” Since the variance is considerably greater than the mean, this situation is
referred to as “overdispersion”, indicating that the negative binomial regression approach (i.e.,
NBRM) is more appropriate. There is, however, another important thing to consider about the
appropriate model for count dependent variables in this study: There are large number of zeros in
health-based violations of SDWA. In fact, 86.2% of community water systems reported a zero
number of violations during the study period. This is also problematic because it cannot be
discerned if a zero in the dataset indicates no violation during a given period, or results because
of issues with identifying and reporting violations, since the violations are often either
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underreported or inaccurately reported by some water systems (Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2018;
Siegel, 2019).
As a result, the zero-inflated negative binomial regression procedure (i.e., ZINB),
introduced by Lambert (1992), respond to count dependent variables that present excess zeros
than one would expect based on a Poisson and negative binomial distribution (Long and Freese,
2001). This study estimates the models for violations of SDWA using a ZINB regression
equation and provides evidence that the ZINB model fit this dataset best among count models.
Above, the health-based violations of SDWA in this study appeared to be
spatially dependent. That is, it has the potential for the error term that is autocorrelated, which
may lead to bias in standard error estimates and increase the probability of type I or Ⅱ statistical
errors (Anselin, 1988). This analysis employs a spatial lag to control for spatial autocorrelation in
the regression models. A spatial lag can be considered as a “weighted average of neighboring
values” (Anselin, 2004). In this case, “neighboring” defines counties that share contiguous
boundaries and vertices. The “values” used to represent this variable were the prevalence of
SDWA violations per community water system of given neighboring counties. This study uses
GeoDa statistical software to generate the spatial lag variable using US county boundary shape
file. A first-order contiguity-based spatial weights matrix was created using the queen criterion
that includes neighbors that share contiguous boundaries and vertices (Anselin and Rey, 2014).
After that, the spatial weights file was utilized to have the weighted average of occurrence of the
SDWA violations during 2016 and 2018 in neighboring counties per each county. Because the
unit of analysis in this study is a community water system, the spatial lag value is reentered into
each community water system along with the county-level served location.
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In this study, multicollinearity was also examined. Although multicollinearity
does not violate any underlying assumption of regression model (i.e., the least squares estimates
are best linear unbiased estimates), it can distort the standard error and regression coefficients.
That is, when independent variables are highly correlated with other variables, this can inflate the
standard errors and lead to erroneous conclusion (Allison, 1999). To detect multicollinearity in
this data, variance inflation factor (VIF) scores were examined among independent variables.
VIF scores that exceed 10 are substantially problematic for multicollinearity (Kennedy, 1985).
However, other researchers suggest that VIF scores should be below 5 (Walker and Madden,
2012). Based on the criteria, it shows that multicollinearity will not have a substantial problem in
this data. All VIF’s in the models fell under 5, and the mean of VIF was 1.80. VIF’s collinearity
diagnostic for all models are provided in Appendix B.
Following these statistical diagnostics tests, the ZINB regression equation predicting
violation of SDWA was conducted.51 Table 6 indicates the result of the negative binomial
proportion of the model. In this model, the main findings are that SDWA violation occurrence
has a positive and significant association with percentage of Hispanic resident (p < 0.001). Thus,
these results indicate that water systems serving communities with a higher Hispanic population
are more likely to commit SDWA violations. Counter to the hypotheses, several independent
variables are not statistically significant in that model: percentage of Black resident, percentage
of poverty, percentage of nonprofit organization, and percentage of voter turnout.

51

The ZINB model estimates the probability of observed SDWA violations per community water system by
including a logit and a negative binominal distribution. The negative binomial model for the probability of SDWA
violation is only reported and primarily discussed in this section. The logit regression model contained in the ZINB
model is presented in the appendix section.
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Table 5. Zero-Inflated Negative Binominal Regression (n=21,854).

% Black
% Hispanic
% Poverty
% Nonprofit org.
% Voter turnout
Size
Medium (Small omitted)
Large
Ground water (Surface omitted)
Private (Public omitted)
Farm-dependent county
Mining-dependent county
Density
% Rural residents
Rural county
Metro
LCV score
Region (South omitted)
Northeast
Midwest
West
Spatial lag: Weighted county-level violation
Model Diagnostics
Chi-square (d.f.)
Likelihood ratio test
Vuong test

SDWA violations
b
SE
.001
.003
.017***
.003
.010
.008
−4
.017
2.96 × 10
.002
.005
-.011
-.106
-.164*
-.174†
.263*
.165
-.1.61 × 10−4**
.004*
-.172
-.062
-.003

.079
.096
.074
.010
.126
.105
.001
.002
.138
.081
.002

-.007
-.176†
-.425***
.028***

.184
.103
.115
.002

560.34 (20)***
1.476***
7.92***

†<0.10 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

The result in Table 5 also indicates that violation occurrence is affected by water source.
Community water systems that provide drinking water from ground water sources have a lower
probability of violations compared to surface water providers (p < 0.05). Water systems located
in farm-dependent counties show higher likelihood of SDWA violations (p < 0.05). Population
density had a negative and significant association with violation occurrence (p < 0.01), while
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percentage of rural residents was positively related to SDWA violation (p < 0.05). That is, water
systems in less densely populated and less urbanized areas appear to be more vulnerable to
violations.
Lastly, to find whether the model (i.e., a zero-inflated negative binomial count
model, ZINB) fits this data better than other count models (a zero-inflated Poisson model, ZIP
and a negative binomial regression model, NBRM), two tests can be done: likelihood-ratio (LR)
test and Vuong test.
First, the LR test examined a null hypothesis that the value of the overdispersion
parameter (log alpha) equals zero to find whether a ZINB fit the data better than a ZIP model
(Long and Freese, 2001). The LR test result indicates that this parameter (log alpha=1.476) is
statistically significant (p < 0.001), indicating the null hypothesis that alpha equals zero should
be rejected. Thus, the ZINB model in this study significantly improves the fit over the ZIP
model.
Second, the Vuong test is conducted to compare the ZINB to the standard negative
binomial model, NBRM. The Vuong test reports a z-score of 7.96, which is statistically
significant (p < 0.001). The result indicates that the ZINB model fits this data better than the
NBRM model (Long, 2001). Overall, these tests indicate that the ZINB model fits this data better
than other count models.

Relationship between Noncompliance and Community Characteristics
Next, we turn to test the relationship between length of noncompliance per system and
community characteristics. Since length of noncompliance can be measured after violations of
SDWA during the study period (January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2018), the number of cases
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(i.e., community water systems) in this model is considerably smaller than that of the first model,
which reduces to 1,861 from 21,845.52 Figure 7 indicates the distribution of days of
noncompliance during the study period. The figure also includes the average length of
noncompliance, 308.58 days with a standard deviation of 235.66 days. The minimum length of
noncompliance is one day, and the maximum length is 1,185 days. The result shows that for
many of the water systems, illegal contamination persists for more than a year.
As shown in Figure 7, the distribution of length of noncompliance appears to be a skewed
variable, which means the regression residuals are also skewed. To resolve the skewed nature of
the variable, it is transformed53 using the natural log (Allison, 1999).
To diagnose the plausibility of heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan test statistic for
heteroscedasticity of residuals was estimated. The test result indicates that it rejects the null
hypothesis of homoscedasticity (constant error variance): That is, heteroscedasticity exists in this
OLS regression model. While heteroscedasticity does not result in any bias in the coefficient
estimate, it provides biased standard errors that make test statistics as well as confidence
intervals inaccurate. One solution to heteroscedasticity is to apply robust standard errors
(Allison, 1999). Therefore, to solve the violation of homoskedasticity this regression model is
conducted with the use of robust standard errors.

52

In this dataset, the total number of community water systems with SDWA violations were 3,010. However, water
systems with unresolved open violations during the study period – that means “Returned to compliance” date is
unknown in the state-reported information – are excluded in this analysis.
53
Logarithmic transformation is a convenient tool of transforming a skewed variable into a more normalized dataset.
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Figure 7. Length of Noncompliance among Community Water Systems.

Another assumption for the accuracy of hypothesis testing is that errors are normally
distributed (i.e., normality assumption). The violation of normality assumption does not affect
coefficient estimates but provides bias in confidence intervals. The errors cannot be observed
directly, so the accuracy of this assumption is indirectly assessed when we examine the residuals
(Allison, 1999). When the residuals are approximately normally distributed, we can assume that
the errors are normally distributed. To check normality assumption, the procedure compares the
observed residuals to the normal distribution by using a kernel density graphical method, which
shows that the observed residuals are normally distributed, and assumes the error term in the
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population is likely to be normally distributed. The kernel density graph is provided in the
appendix section.
Results of the OLS model predicting the length of SDWA noncompliance are shown in
Table 6. Main findings indicate that percent Black, percent Hispanic, percent nonprofitorganization, and percent voter-turnout variables are statistically related to time compliance
actions toward SDWA. In other words, counties with a higher prevalence of the variables noted
above, have longer time to correction of a violation.
The length of enforcement actions for SDWA has a positive association with percentage
Black (p < 0.05) and Hispanic residents (p < 0.001). That means water systems serving
communities with higher Black and Hispanic population are more likely to take longer to be
corrected. This may suggest inadequate enforcement actions toward SDWA compliance in Black
and Hispanic communities, suggesting the existence of environmental injustice related to SDWA
enforcement. The results also indicate that length of noncompliance is negatively related with
percentage of nonprofit organization (p < 0.05) and voter turnout (p < 0.05). When community
water systems violate the SDWA, those located in a county with lower capacity of civic
engagement tend to take longer length of time to meet the regulatory compliance. Counter to the
hypothesis, poverty variable is not associated with the length of noncompliance.
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Table 6. Ordinary Least Squares Regression (n=1,861).
Length (log) of Noncompliance
b
Robust SE
.005*
.002
.009***
.002
-.007
.006
-.027*
.014
-.007*
.003

% Black
% Hispanic
% Poverty
% Nonprofit org.
% Voter turnout
Size (Small omitted)
Medium
Large
Ground water (Surface omitted)
Private (Public omitted)
Farm-dependent county
Mining-dependent county
Density
% Rural residents
Rural county
Metro
LCV score
Region (South omitted)
Northeast
Midwest
West
Constant
Chi-square (d.f.)
Adj R square

-.036
.012
-.153**
.064
.233**
-.003
-.1.71 × 10−4**
.002*
-.163†
-.150*
-.005**

.058
.069
.049
.069
.081
.070
.001
.001
.092
.061
.001

.028
-.030
-.210*
6.06***
8.99 (19)***
.090

.132
.066
.091
.228

†<0.10 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

When considering control variables in the model, the length of time out of compliance is
related to water source. It was discovered that surface water providers have longer length of time
out of compliance compared to ground water systems (p < 0.05). Water systems serving a farmdependent county have a longer length of time to correcting SDWA noncompliance (p < 0.01).
The finding indicates that water systems serving rural communities tend to take longer to correct
a noncompliance enforcement action: community water systems located in less densely
population (p < 0.01), higher proportion of rural residents (p < 0.05), and nonmetro counties (p <
0.05) are likely to take longer length of time to comply the regulation. In addition, the length of
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noncompliance for community water systems is also associated with states’ politics; water
systems in states with lower League of Conservation Voters scores (LCV) tend to have longer
length of time to achieve regulatory compliance (p < 0.01). That is, the less environmental
concern in a location measured by the LCV, the longer it takes to correct a compliance issue.

Conclusion
In the chapter five, preliminary analyses, descriptive statistics, and results for hypotheses
tests were provided. The descriptive statistics for US drinking water quality violations indicate
that there were 15,164 SDWA violations with 74,012,899 people possibly affected during 2016
and 2018.
Table 7 presents a summary of the results for each hypothesis test. By using spatial
pattern of SDWA violations, the SDWA violation is not randomly distributed across the nation.
Regionally, hot spots of SDWA violations are identified in the Southwest and the South,
including counties in Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, Arkansas, and California. The
proportion of Hispanic residents appear positively associated with SDWA violations, while other
independent variables are not associated with SDWA noncompliance. When examining the
relationship between length of noncompliance per system and community characteristics, both
Black and Hispanic population are associated with slower enforcement actions toward SDWA
compliance. The average length of noncompliance appears negatively and significantly related
with nonprofit organization and voter turnout. That is, community water systems serving
communities with lower capacity of civic engagement tend to take longer to ensure compliance
with enforcement actions. Poverty is not statistically related to both likelihood of SDWA
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violations and the length of noncompliance. The implications of these findings are discussed in
chapter 6.

Table 7. Summary of Hypotheses Tests.
Supported?
Hypothesis

Yes

H1: SDWA violations are distributed non-randomly across geographic
locations, presenting spatial clusters (hot spot locations of violations).

X

H2: As percentage of Hispanic residents in a community increases, the
number of health-based violation of the SDWA Community water system
serving the community also increases.

X

No

H3: As percentage of Blacks residents in a community increases, the number
of health-based violation of the SDWA Community water system serving the
community also increases.

X

H4: As poverty rate in a community increases, the number of health-based
violation of the SDWA Community water system serving the community also
increases.

X

H5: As proportion of nonprofit community organization in a community
decreases, the number of health-based violation of the SDWA Community
water system serving the community increases.

X

H6: As average of voting rate in a community decreases, the number of
health-based violation of the SDWA Community water system serving the
community increases.

X

H7: As percentage of Hispanic residents in a community increases, the
average length of noncompliance per a community water system serving the
community is also longer.

X

H8: As percentage of Blacks residents in a community increases, the average
length of noncompliance per a community water system serving the
community is also longer.

X

H9: As poverty rate in a community increases, the average length of
noncompliance per a community water system serving the community is also
longer.

X

H10: As proportion of nonprofit community organization in a community
decreases, the average length of noncompliance per a community water
system serving the community is also longer.

X

H11: As average of voting rate in a community decreases, the average length
of noncompliance per a community water system serving the community is
also longer

X
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CHAPTER SIX:
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study explored health-based violation of SDWA across the nation during 2016 and
2018. During that time, there were 15,164 SDWA violations causes by community water systems
that serve more than 500 customers. The most frequent violation type is disinfection and
disinfection byproducts (DBPs) violations, representing 65.4% (9,928) of all violations. There
are many factors that influence concentration of disinfection byproduct in drinking water such as
organic material in source water, temperature, and other mixtures of chemicals, and aging water
infrastructure (Evans, Campbell, and Naidenko, 2020). To note, the widespread prevalence of
DBPs violations is also partially attributed by regulatory changes (Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2018).
Although community water systems intend to provide safe drinking water through
disinfection and treatment processes – the common way of disinfection is to add chlorine54 to
drinking water suppliers since 20th century – disinfected drinking water with chlorine results in
formation of unexpected byproducts such as the trihalomethanes (THMs) and haloacetic acids
(HAAs) that were observed to be associated with bladder cancer risk in epidemiology studies
(Evans, Campbell, and Naidenko, 2020). To be protective of human health, EPA has set limits on
the amount of DBPs55 in drinking water provided by water systems through three stages. After
the new federal regulations for DBPs, the Stage1 Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts

54

Chlorine is applied to keep safe drinking water in treatment processes from drinking water supplier to the
consumer’s tap water by eliminating waterborne bacteria and viruses (see CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/safewater/chlorination-byproducts.html)
55
EPA has determined that TTHM standard should be lowered from 100 mg/L to 80mg/L after the State 1
Disinfectant and Disinfection Byproducts Rule (see EPA, https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/stage-1-and-stage-2disinfectants-and-disinfection-byproducts-rules).
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Rule, were implemented in 2002-2004, dramatic increase in DBPs violation appears.
Subsequently, when the Stage 2 Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts Rule became
enforceable after 2013, DBPs violence occurrence56 continues to increase (Fedinick, Taylor, and
Roberts, 2019). Under the new regulatory stages of DBPs, community water systems need
treatment costs to comply. During the adjustment process, compliance with new water quality
regulation can be a challenge for water systems, especially those serving poor communities of
color and rural areas due to limited treatment capabilities (Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2018). Thus, the
recent implementation of revised regulation of DBPs resulted in the most widespread frequency
of incompliance. To note, the likelihood of the violence become greater especially in minority
communities outside urban areas because of insufficient waster infrastructure and lack of
financial resources (Allaire, Wu, and Lall, 2018; Siegel, 2019; Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts,
2019).

Ethnic Disparity in Safety of Drinking Water
As the result of the first hypothesis test indicated, populations that are exposed to unsafe
drinking water are clustered in certain areas. At the county level, there is a “contaminated
drinking water belt” in the nation that runs along parts of the Southwest and South regions.
Specifically, by using the local Moran’s I statistic, 143 counties are detected as “High-High”
clusters of SDWA violations, which are concentrated in California’s Central Valley, the Texas
colonias, and in the rural South.

56

According to the report by the Natural Resources Defense Council, during 2016 and 2019, the most frequent
violations were DBPs, coliform and improper treatment of surface water (Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019).
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Notably, some of the intense hot spots have large proportion of Hispanics. Ethnic
disparities in exposure to unsafe drinking water become apparent when we compare spatial
clusters of SDWA by quartiles of percent Hispanic residents across the nation. Figure 8 shows
that as the higher Hispanic quartile, as the more clusters of SDWA violations appears. In
addition, the hot spots appear to move toward the Southwest regions as the quartiles with
Hispanic population increases.

Figure 8. Clusters of SDWA Violation by Quartiles of Percent Hispanic Resident.

The findings based on the tests for hypotheses two through six also indicated that the
proportion of Hispanics was a significant predictor of SDWA violations: the larger the share of
Hispanic residents living in a county, the higher the frequency of SDWA violations community
water systems (see also Figure 9). Prior studies provide support for the association we observed
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between the proportion of Hispanics and the frequency of SDWA violation by water systems
(Balazs et al., 2011; Pilley et al, 2009; Schaider et al., 2019).

Figure 9. Marginal Effect of Percent Hispanic Resident on SDWA Violation Frequency.

According to previous researchers, one reason why predominately Hispanic communities
are more like to be exposed to unsafe drinking water is due in part to the agricultural
contamination of source waters (Schaider et al., 2019). Many agricultural communities (e.g.,
rural California) tend to have a high proportion of Hispanic farmworkers, and in many such
areas, drinking water is often polluted by intensive agriculture and livestock production with
insufficient wastewater treatment and disposal utilities.
However, the current disparities in access to safe drinking water have been associated
with a historically attributed interaction between political, economic, and social forces and
factors (London et al., 2018). That is, to fundamentally understand why many Hispanic
communities are disproportionately exposed to unsafe water, the historical practices such as
exclusionary urban planning need to be addressed. Today water challenges such as lack of access
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to clean water, aging water pipes, and soil tainted by septic tanks in communities along with the
U.S.-Mexican border, known as colonias, intersect with the legacy of segregation (Del Real,
2019). In the 1960s, local and federal governments adopted a racial zoning practice that caused
poor communities of color to be treated as risky investments. Continuing today, the “selective
annexation” practice, or so called municipal ‘underbounding’, which have replaced the racial
zoning policy, is used to divert investment away from neighbors that are already socially and
politically disempowered (e.g., low-income residents in rural areas, communities of color, and
immigrants) from funding in favor of existing urban towns. Consequently, many of formerly
redlined communities are still poor and lack sufficient infrastructure (Anderson, 2008).
According to a recent report by U.S Water Alliance (London et al., 2018), there is
empirical evidence that the persistent effects of discriminatory urban planning left rural
communities in California (e.g., San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Merced, Madera, Fresno, Kings,
Tulare, and Kern Counties in the San Joaquin Valley) exposed to drinking water insecurity.
Rural areas such as Matheny in Tulare County and Fairmead in Madera County in the San
Joaquin Valley that were once settled by black farmworkers in the 20th century, have more
recently been transformed, and are now largely inhabited by Hispanic residents. However, the
historical barriers to infrastructure investment continue, even as new Hispanic residents move in
(Del Real, 2019).
There is one example – the process of selective annexation in the Madera County’s
housing project and city planning that was implemented in 1969. The urban planning project
focused on the development of metropolitan areas, along with exclusion of “rural slums” where
were predominate Hispanic families. City planners steered new development into neighboring
towns to promote residential growth by providing infrastructure investment such as public water
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systems, recreation, and roadway facilities, what was called a “Bull’s Eye” approach. While the
Bull’s Eye approach was an efficient way to reduce the cost of expanding towns both for the
county and for private investors, it marginalized rural colonies that already lacked basic
infrastructure because local investment in these areas was estimated too costly (U.S. Water
Alliance, 2019).
There are grants and incentives from federal and state funding offered by United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to help such vulnerable communities. However, these
supports could not provide enough incentives to address discriminatory practices such as
selective annexation. According to a report by California State Water Resources Control Board
(CWB, 2016), 57 the City of Tulare (in the Southern San Joaquin Valley) refused to connect their
water system to Matheny Tract, one mile away from Tulare, even after the State provided about
$5 million to encourage safe water suppliers to connect to the residents of Matheny. Residents in
Matheny, mostly composed of historically less-empowered Hispanic populations, were exposed
to unsafe level of arsenic in its drinking water. In 2015, the State Water Board’s Division of
Drinking Water ordered mandatory consolidation into the larger system so that the City of Tulare
must supply water to the residents of Matheny.
The discriminatory practices may have ceased, but disadvantaged communities that were
historically shaped by segregation still face ecological threats such as unsafe drinking water
(London et al., 2018). Decades of disinvestments for rural areas and minorities communities
(e.g., rural California’s water pipes, and isolated colonias in Arizona, New Mexico and Texas)
endure inferior water infrastructure such as old pipes and fewer resources to keep adequate

California Water Resources Control Board’s Media Release, 2016. Retrieved from
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/press_room/press_releases/2016/pr4116_tulare_consolidation.pdf.
57
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wastewater treatment and disposal systems (Balaz and Ray, 2014; Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts,
2019; Schaider et al., 2019).

The Higher the Concentration Minorities, The Longer Noncompliance Length
As the results for the tests of hypothesis seven to eleven indicated, there are racial and
ethnic disparities in the enforcement of drinking water quality regulations. That is, those serving
communities with higher proportion of African American residents as well as Hispanic residents
tend to take longer to be returned to compliance. In addition, civic engagement factors are also
associated with slower enforcement of SDWA.

Environmental Injustice in Regulatory Enforcement
To note, our findings do not disclose intentional racial/ethnic discrimination at work in
the SDWA enforcement. However, it provides supports for previous works with the
environmental justice perspective that contextualizes environmental factors that harm public
health and examine how race, color, and class are associated with the distribution of
environmental enforcement (Clark, 2018; Lavelle and Coyle, 1992; Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns,
2004a, 2004b; Lynch et al., 2017; Konisky 2009).
Figure 10 indicates racial/ethnic disparity in the enforcement of drinking water qulity
violations – as the share of a county’s Black population served by a water system increases, the
length of noncompliance goes longer as well, all other variables held constant. In regard to
countys’ Hispanic populations, a similar pattern, – but more inclinded slope in comparision to
Black’s one – is observed. When we consider the association between noncompliance length and
white populations after controlling other factors, – though its finding has not been shown in the
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previous OLS regression model – there is, however, an opposite direction shown in the figure:
the higher the proportion of white residents served by a water system, the faster they see
compliance actions.
This finding suggests that governors seem to at least allow out-of-compliance-water
systems to remain in noncompliance longer if they have higher percentages of people of color.
As considering prior studies that provide empirical evidence for the unequal enforcement along
racial/ethnic lines (Konisky, 2009; Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns, 2004a, 2004b), there is also
existence of institutional racial and ethnic bias in social control to drinking water quality
violations.

Predicted noncompliance length (lg)
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Figure 10. Predicted Length (lg) of Noncompliance by Race/Ethnic Composition.
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Within the context of environmental injustice, Bullard (2001) made a similar point that
the nation’s environmental laws and regulations are not equally enforced across individuals and
geographic locations, citing a study from National Law Journal that:
“There is a racial divide in the way the U.S. government cleans toxic waste sites and
punish polluters. White communities see faster action, better results, and stiffer penalties
than communities where blacks, Hispanics and other minorities live. … These findings
suggest that unequal protection is placing communities of color at special risk.” (p. 157).
Why does such unequal enforcement of environmental regulations continue to exist?
With the critical race perspective, Pulido (2017) argues that existence of discriminatory control
for environmental hazards based on social grouping (e.g., race, class, and gender) reveals the
racialized nature of capitalism. Devaluation of blacks or nonwhite is the centrality of capitalism,
so called ‘racial capitalism’ (see also Pulido, 2017). Especially, poor communities of minorities
have the least value and power, sometimes regarded as “outcast surplus” population (i.e., no
value to capital) in the capitalist system: It is a matter of power and control by a social group in
the capitalist system that reinforces and protects the dominant group’s worldview (e.g.,
individualism and meritocracy) – and applies this view to others and marginalizes those who are
deviant from that norm (see also DiAngelo, 2018). Whites take a privileged position in the
institutions of society, establishing a set of policies and cultural practices – and differentially
bring advantages for the dominant group that is backed by legal authority and institutional
control (DiAngelo, 2018).
Based on the critical race perspective, especially with Pulido’s intersectional insight
between racism and capitalism, potential health impact of environmental outcome on
communities of color – like long-term exposure to unsafe drinking water – are usually less
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important than the well-being of the dominant group (e.g., white communities). Whether it is
consciously or unconsciously, the unequal differentiation of human value, reflected in the
capitalist society, inevitably produces institutionalized racial and ethnic discrimination in
environmental protection and treatment (Pulido, 2016; 2017).
Using the integrated lens of green/state criminology and radical criminology, Lynch
(2016) made a similar note that “the political economic power of structure of capitalism” (p.248)
results in unequal distribution of community advantages and disadvantages (CAD) within society
(for examples of unequal distribution of CAD impacted by racially discriminatory policies in
American cities see Rothstein (2017)), in which the failure of the government to use its power to
address unequal dispersion of ecological disadvantage communities face appears to be one of
forms of green/state crime and injustice such as different types and levels of governor’s reaction
to community toxic exposure. Importantly, the institutional failure of environmental regulations
in disadvantaged communities causes adverse health consequences (for example, the
consequence of elevated blood lead levels in children impacted by Flint drinking water crisis see,
Hanna-Attisha et al., (2016)) – and contributes to pervasive health disparities related with
concentrated ecological harms across the nation (Bullard and Wright, 2012; Lynch, 2016).
EJ scholars have, thus, challenged the dominant environmental protection paradigm58 by
emphasizing the transformative politics and grassroot movements from top-down approach to
bottom-up approach (Bullard and Wright, 2012) and from a pyramid structure to a web structure
(Cole and Foster, 2001). Using the racial/ethnic equity perspective, the environmental justice

According to Bullard and Wright (2009: p. 23), “the dominant environmental protection paradigm institutionalize
unequal enforcement; trades human health for profit; places the burden of proof on the victims and not on the
polluting industry; legitimates human exposure to harmful chemicals, pesticides, and hazardous substances;
promotes risky technologies; exploits the vulnerability of economically and politically disenfranchised communities;
subsidizes ecological destruction creates an industry around risk assessment and risk management; delays cleanup
actions; and fails to develop pollution prevention as the overarching and dominant strategy”.
58
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framework attempts to find root causes of unequal protection or differential exposure and
remove environmental discrimination in connection to other social discriminatory issues such as
racial zoning and housing discrimination (Bullard and Wright, 2012; Lynch 2016; Taylor, 2014).
With the EJ framework, the unequal enforcement of SDWA will be discussed in the next section.

Unequal Enforcement of SDWA
The unequal treatment for communities of color is possibly related to the intersection of
discriminatory practices and limited access to federal/state resources, based on the previous
literature. As mentioned above, the historical and living legacy of segregation embedded in
communities of color that are already overburdened with environmental hazards endures a higher
proportion of water systems that deliver unsafe drinking water due to disinvestment of water
infrastructures (Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019). Even though federal grant funding projects
(e.g., the Rural Community Assistance Partnership) has been enacted to support water systems
serving vulnerable communities since the early 1970s, the water policy could not solve the
unequal distribution of basic water infrastructure because it has largely focused on technological
solutions to water problems through large-scale water developments such as irrigation and flood
prevention (Vanderwarker, 2012) and less discussed “reparations” that restore historically
marginalization of communities of color (Steinberg, 1993; Del Real, 2019). The federal water
policy overlooked the persistent water contamination and disproportionate lack of access to
resources that such disadvantaged communities have confronted.
At the local level, investments on restoration of aging water systems are generated by the
local tax base, so such investment is limited, particularly, in small communities of color with
limited financial capacity (Siegel, 2019). The water systems in those communities, consequently,
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are left to rely on state and federal support. Since the federal water infrastructure funding could
not offer loans and grants to all the systems in need59 (Laufenberg, 1998; Vanderwarker, 2012),
such funding is competitive and not always feasible, as far as there are more than 51,000 water
systems nationwide today.
In this context, disadvantaged communities confront barriers to access the benefits of
federal and state environmental programs such as Drinking Water State Revolving Funds
(DWSRF) to support their water systems to comply with SDWA rules, because they have lack of
qualified workforce in their systems to meet the funding criteria60 with extensive engineering and
reporting requirements for the grants and loans (Balazs and Ray, 2014; Siegel, 2019). As an
empirical study also indicated, communities of color were less likely to take an advantage of
grant to reconstruct modern wastewater treatment systems (Imperial, 1999). Thus, such
disadvantaged communities face harder time to prioritize investments in reparation for out-ofcompliance-water systems, and at the same time, the inequitable distribution of infrastructure
funding under the federal/state programs makes such systems take longer to be returned to
comply with the health standards (Vanderwarker, 2012).
The prolong regulatory failure of SDWA rules has also reflected a lack of commitment of
local water/environmental agencies to solve water inequities (Wilson et al., 2010). As the Flint’s
crisis has been shown, lax enforcement for unsafe drinking water (i.e., Flint residents drank
contaminated drinking water for more than a year) has disproportionate effects on the politically
less-empowered residents who are already burdened by environmental hazards and historically
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For example, 2016 congressional funds were about $99.4 million that are not enough to satisfy the current need
for the tribal communities, $2.7 billon (Natural Resources Congress, 2016). In addition, the 2018 American Water
Association estimated that $ 1trillion over the next 25 years is needed to fix the aged water infrastructure across the
nation (EPA, 2018).
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Typically, applicants must prove that they have adequate technical, managerial, and financial capacity to manage
the water systems to obtain the funding (CWB, 2020).
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inadequate sewer/water treatment systems for decades (Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019).
The report of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission (2017) itself acknowledged that the Flint’s
crisis was partially due to lack of serious attention to residents’ concerns about the water. Anna
Clark, who is a journalist of The Poisoned City (2018), also concluded that the crisis is a case of
the environmental racism and wrote: “People in Flint were frustrated by the unlikelihood of the
state dismissing their complaints had they lived in wealthier and whiter communities.” (Clark,
2018: p.206).
This is not just the case in the Flint water system. The local governments routinely fail to
react immediately to chronic drinking water problems, particularly Hispanic rural communities
(Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019; London et al., 2018). For example, in 2012, even though
Lanare community in California’s Central Valley was eligible for federal and state funds to
address contaminated drinking water caused by agricultural runoff and naturally occurring
arsenic, the state Department of Public Health did not enact to disperse the money immediately.
Due to the state’s lack of financial accountability and its unspent federal funds, $455 million, the
U.S. EPA gave a notice to cut off additional funds including $260 million in loan payment
(Garrison, 2013)61. As a recent report by Urban Water Innovation Network (2018) points out,
there is an ongoing water-related problem caused by the exclusive institution and austerity
policies that some of local environmental agency and water systems failed to include
communities with political marginalization in the decision-making process (Lauren, Sarango and
Harlan, 2018). Local government’s negligent enforcement and exclusionary decision-making
process leave marginalized residents to cope with long-term exposure to unsafe drinking water as
best they can – for example, by buying expensive home water filters or bottled water for drinking
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https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2013-jun-16-la-me-drinking-water-20130617-story.html
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and cooking purposes (Balazs and Ray, 2014; Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019; Siegel, 2019;
U.S. Water Alliance, 2019). Some of households in California spend up to 10% of their income
to buy bottled water due to limited access to safe drinking water, according to a 2018 report62 in
the New York Times.
In contrast, strong civic involvement can be one of solutions to the water systems’ longterm noncompliance of SDWA rules. As this study’s finding indicated, local civic engagement
factors measured by proportion of nonprofit organizations and voter turnout can determine the
length of exposure to unsafe drinking water. Communities that have more grassroots political
voice can be costly for water systems and government agencies. As Clean Water Action (CWA),
one of non-profit organizations, stated that “city officials are especially nervous about the
possibility of protests or newspaper articles reporting on failing to address lead pipe problems.”
(Siegel, 2019: 202), such ongoing pressure makes local water government agencies more
responsive to address the water-related problems and immediately enact protective regulations
like CWA’s projects that have been coordinated with other NGOs as well as government
agencies for lead pipes removal in Boston communities and cleaning nitrates and arsenic in water
in the Central Valley of California (Siegel, 2019).

Implications for Policy
Affordable Funding and Equitable Access
Several policy implications are suggested based on the findings. The first thing is to
detect vulnerable communities that have limited access to safe drinking water as well as are
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See, the detailed information at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/opinion/environment/safe-drinking-waterfor-all.
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exposed to polluted source water. Identification of communities under the ongoing risk of unsafe
drinking water is helpful for decision-makers to implement specific goals and prioritization of
financial/technological support to resolve inequity and environmental injustice. Recently,
California has established a good example of priority-setting policies63 that could be a model for
the nation to fulfill the human right64 to water – “every human being has the right to safe, clean,
affordable, and accessible water adequate for human consumption, cooking, and sanitary
purposes.”
In 2019, the Safe and Affordable Funding for Equity and Resilience Program (SAFER),
under the California Senate Bill 200, was designed to identify high-risk water systems and
support local financial/technical assistance to historically under-resourced communities working
with local government agencies for sustainable water systems. This program includes an
additional $130 million each year by 2030 to help vulnerable communities and small systems
with violation of SDWA (CWB, 2020). According to a report in the New York Times, the state
of California also established a new pair of bills to address the water inequity in 2019. Senate
Bill 844 raises taxes on the use of water pollutants like fertilizer manufacturers and large
agriculture operations and the other Bill 845 is to apply a “voluntary 95-cent-per-month tax” by
water customers to fund safe drinking water programs that would be prioritized to disadvantaged
communities at the risk of contaminated drinking water such as arsenic and uranium (Firestone
and De Anda, 2018). As such, larger, diverse, and stable funds can help to achieve both a short-
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The State Water Boards in California that was created aided by the Legislature and stakeholders in 2012, can draw
from various sources of funding such as the General Fund Appropriation (Under Assembly Bill 72), Drinking Water
State Resolving Fund, Bond Funding, and Safe and Affordable Drinking Water Fund. Retrieved from
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/publications_forms/publications/factsheets/docs/faq_safe_drinking_water_program
_overview_factsheet.pdf.
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The Water Code as Section 106.3 under the Assembly Bill 685, California the first state in the country to
legislatively conduct its commitment to the human right to water. Retrieved from
ttps://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/hr2w/.
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term goal by providing safe drinking water delivery temporarily by installing proper treatment
systems as well as long-term solutions with new water infrastructure replacement and the
consolidation of water systems. The limitation of this program/policy, however, is its voluntary
nature.
With variety of sources available, developing a simple application/process for the funding
can help local communities, particularly for those who are both under-resourced and
understaffed, access easily. Although many opportunities to obtain funding are provided, there
are still complexed processes and requirements to be eligible for the funding. According to the
2016 EPA’s action plan, a “one-stop” on-line water infrastructure funding portal will be created
to assist small water systems and low-income communities with identifying funding sources and
financing approaches (EPA, 2016). Working with federal governments, state and local officers
can offer a more centralized online portal where the applicants can search for appropriate
funding guideline, predevelopment projects, or other planning requirements, and make
applications in a uniformed process nationwide.

Consolidation of Community Drinking Water Systems
As mentioned before, the U.S. water system network is too fragmented – more than
51,000 water suppliers – compared to other utilities such as 3,800 electric utilities. In all, over 90
% of these systems provide drinking water to less than 10,000 customers – and more than half of
them serve 500 people or fewer. These smaller water systems face many challenges such as high
cost of providing water, lower capacity, and lack access to updated technologies (Siegel, 2019).
Water system consolidations can help disadvantaged communities to access improvement in
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service by improving efficiency of using source water, building system capacity, and increasing
the base of ratepayers.
Consolidation includes a broad spectrum of potential responses that includes both
physical and non-physical considerations (Nylen, Pannu, and Kiparsky, 2018). Depending on
conditions, in practice, small water systems are connected to neighboring higher capacity
system(s); in other cases, more than two systems are combined to create one system; or systems
remain physically separate but share financial, workforce, or technical capacity (U.S. Water
Alliance, 2019).
If consolidation is the appropriate solution that ensures community benefits and water
equity, state and local government should implement mandatory consolidation orders, like
“inclusionary zoning” ordinances65 perspective. For example, in April 2016, the California State
Water Board has implemented first mandatory consolidation between city of Tulare and Pratt
Mutual Water Company in Tulare County under “Senate Bill 88” that was passed in June 2015,
authorizing the state board to “order consolidation with a receiving water system where a public
water system, or a state small water system within a disadvantaged community, consistently fails
to provide an adequate supply of safe drinking water.” 66
At the same time, the authorities should provide funding incentives and additional
liability protection for consolidations and regionalization. To develop and ensure successful
consolidations, various legal services for the consolidation process should be provided as well as
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It is a kind of public policy (i.e., zoning ordinances) that integrate low-income households into middle class
neighborhoods to solve the isolation of poor families in urban cities and their absence from affluent suburbs: for
example, the ordinance forces developers to set aside a port of units in new urban planning for low-income
households. Montgomery County, Maryland gave a good example of inclusionary zoning policy (Rothstein, 2017)
66
Senate Bill 88. Retrieved from http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/sen/sb_00510100/sb_88_bill_20150624_chaptered.htm.
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joint learning opportunities to share knowledge of benefits and burdens of consolidation among
community members are also necessary (Nylen, Pannu, and Kiparsky, 2018).

Protective Regulations and Effective Enforcement
To secure and provide safe drinking water, it is basically important to prevent
contamination of sources of drinking water. However, during the former Trump’s administration,
many of environmental laws and regulations for water pollution were rolled back or weakened
(Popovich, Albeck-Ripka, and Pierre-Louis, 2021). For example, water pollution protections for
wetlands and waterways under the Clean Water Act (CWA) were weakened and a rule for
limiting toxic discharge from coal plants into public waterways was also loosened. In addition,
the new regulations of SDWA on lead and copper in drinking water – doubled the amount of
time allotted to remove lead pipes in water systems with serious level of lead (i.e., from 14 years
to 33 years for full replacement) – were weakened to prevent contamination of drinking water
(Friedman, 2020). The Biden administration is expected to nullify many of Trump-era rollbacks
by executive orders, even though some rules will be difficult to change and take months or years
to be replace.
It is important to strengthen protective regulations and effective enforcement actions that
better consider the integrated connection between the CWA and the SDWA, which helps address
polluted source water that has disproportionately impacted disadvantaged communities (Allaire,
Wu, and Lall, 2018). For example, the “green infrastructure” movement that more relies on
natural systems such as wetlands to improve water quality as well as quantity should be widely
encouraged across the nation (Beckman, 2014). As the Natural Resources Defense Council also
insisted, EPA and states should aggressively use the section 311 of CWA – that protects water
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contaminations caused by large amounts of hazardous chemicals – and the section 1431 of
SDWA– that immediately prevents risks to public health from drinking water pollution
(Fedinick, Taylor, and Roberts, 2019).
Furthermore, under the Biden-era administration that emphasizes the importance of
environmental protection, congress should amend the 1996 Amendment of SDWA to enact a
more protective standard to the degree that is feasible to remove the unregulated contaminants
from drinking water rather than burdensome cost-benefit analysis (Siegel, 2019).

Community-Based Cooperation and Partnership
Community water governance has a crucial key in ensuring safe drinking water inequity.
There are many drinking water community organizations that are gathered up to assist politically
powerless community to resist ongoing health risks. Such organizations can provide more
opportunities for residents to participate in local water boards and help them to understand the
complex water system. As the founder of Clean Water Action, David Zwick insisted67, awakened
residents are always necessary to strengthen protective regulations for politically disempowered
communities to demand a right to safe drinking water.
Importance of civic participation should be emphasized in all levels of governments,
water systems, private keyholders and civil society for sustainable water systems. There is an
example that can increase community members in civic engagement through the communitybased approach – so called EPA’s Environmental Justice Collaborative Problem-Solving Model
(CPS Model). The CPS model68 has been introduced in 2004 to provide insights on how
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https://www.cleanwateraction.org/features/memoriam-david-zwick
For the detailed information about the CPS model, see https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201606/documents/cps-manual-12-27-06.pdf.
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community organizations are able to work together with other keyholders to address
environmental issues in local communities (EPA, 2008). This model has seven elements (see
Figure 11) that can be used in distressed communities to achieve environmental justice – all
people are treated equally regardless of race/ethnicity and socioeconomic factors. Likewise, the
community-led initiatives for solving drinking water injustice will be more successful by
dedicating to certain goals that are included in the CPS model:
•

Empowerment: Community organizations can become involved directly in
collaborative processes with other keyholders to identify water-related problems.

•

Strategic planning: Community organizations can engage a diverse array of
stakeholders to set up short-term and long-term goals and plans for
sustainable/equitable community water system.

•

Education: Community organizations can offer information and mentoring for
residents in interested in community water governance.

•

Inclusive governance: Collaborative problem-solving process provides
opportunities for community organizations to serve meaningfully in decisionmaking processes regarding drinking water related policies/regulations.

•

Sustainable water systems: The collaboration of a diverse array of stakeholders
realizes the vision that all residents easily access safe drinking water – as well as
builds “community resilience initiative” to address challenges such as climate
change risks.
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Figure 11. EPA's EJ Collaborative Problem-Solving Model.
Source: EPA’s Environmental Justice Collaborative Problem-Solving Model, 2008.

Directions for Future Study
The US drinking water systems have faced ‘the dawn of the replacement ear’. The aged
water infrastructure not only causes drinking water disruptions but also may affect the quality of
drinking water. Especially, low-income rural populations suffer from contaminated drinking
water because aged water treatment facilities are not able to adequately filter out chemicals in
water such as nitrates (AWWA, 2001). This study does not account for the age impact of water
system on the SDWA violation. Future study should explore how the age variable of water
system impacts the results of the current analyses – likelihood of drinking water quality violation
and length of SDWA noncompliance.
This study applied OLS model for length of noncompliance, the second dependent
variable. The date period of noncompliance takes non-negative integer values, which can be also
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analyzed using count regression models such as the Poisson regression model and negative
binomial regression model. Even though this study diagnosed the plausibility of
heteroscedasticity – that may be caused by the linear regression model applied for the count
outcomes – by using the Breusch-Pagan test statistic and applied robust standard errors to solve
the issue (Allison, 1999), future study can use of other statistical methods such as count
regression models to explore the relationship between days of noncompliance and community
structure levels.
Beyond community water systems, future study should be done on the safety and
contamination of U.S. private wells. According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS),
about 42 million households depend on private wells (Dieter and Maupin, 2017). However, the
private wells are not regulated by SDWA69 – any kind of water testing is not required.
In 2009, the USGS also indicated, based on a sampling of about 2,100 wells across the
nation, 23% of them were polluted by chemical contamination – at a level of a potential health
risk (USGS, 2009). Among various types of contaminants in those wells, high concentration
nitrate pollutant was found, especially in agriculture areas, which come from excessive fertilizer
use and can be transmitted through groundwater. In addition, in Wisconsin, approximate 6% of
the state’s private wells (i.e., 42,000 out of 676,000) were contaminated with serious level of
nitrates, or E. coil bacteria that may threaten human health (Healy, 2018; Wisconsin Council
Report, 2018).
With lack of environmental inspections/regulations and preferential treatment for big
industry, it is expected that contamination in the wells disproportionately impacts low-income
rural communities via polluted source water and chemical spills. Based on the earlier studies,

According to the EPA’s website, “EPA does not regulate private wells nor does it provide recommended criteria
or standards for individual wells.” Retrieved from https://www.epa.gov/privatewells.
69
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future research needs to focus on national trends in contaminated drinking water wells as well as
find whether environmental injustice exists in communities relying on the private wells.
In addition, another future study needs to focus on climate changes and its related
problems for drinking water. Climate-related risks were not a primary focus in 1970s when water
policy foundations and related acts such as CWA and SDWA were established (Beckman, 2014).
However, the risk of climate change and its related severe weather events place growing stress
on the nation’s aging water infrastructure (Lauren, Sarango and Harlan, 2018; Vanderwarker,
2012). It is expected that climate change dramatically reduces water access and increases
flooding, which will intensity water-related public health threat: for example, as the Katrina case
indicated, heavy rain can exceed wastewater treatment capacity, causing health hazard to people
(Bullard and Wright, 2009); higher temperature and changing flows will also worsen poor
quality source water – by creating toxic conditions in ground and surface water combined with
more use of fertilizer and pesticides due to changing conditions (Beckman, 2014).
With a predicted increase in climate change risks, we need to focus on how the impact of
climate change will exacerbate the existing drinking water inequality. Specifically, vulnerable
communities, such as communities of color and poor rural populations, that currently have
unequal access to water infrastructure and live closer to toxic facilities will be more affected by
human-caused climate change. Further attention needs to be paid at exploring how the
historically-marginalized communities would be more exposed to unsafe drinking water that is
compounded by disparities in political and economic decision-makers for climate change
preparedness. By doing so, climate equity-oriented policies will be also suggested to contribute
to water justice as well as sustainability.

128

Conclusion
Drinking water systems in the United States confront several challenges such as aging
water infrastructure, polluted source water, fragmented water systems, and exclusive governance.
The burdens, however, are not equally distributed across the nation. Disadvantaged communities
such as minority communities and low-income populations are disproportionately affected by
drinking water-related problems.
This study focuses on drinking water quality violations and slow enforcement actions of
SDWA during 2016 to 2018. Based on the political-economic perspective, it examines three
main hypotheses: 1) whether SDWA violations are distributed randomly across geographic
locations; 2) whether compositions of a community including race/ethnicity, poverty, and civic
engagement are related to the exposure to contaminated drinking water; 3) and whether these
factors are also associated with unequal enforcement of drinking water quality regulations.
The main findings are indicated: first, SDWA violations are concentrated in California’s
Central Valley, the Texas colonias and rural South; second, water systems serving communities
with a larger proportion of Hispanic residents tend to have a higher frequency of SDWA
violations; third, while the average length of water system’s noncompliance appears longer in
communities with higher proportion of Black and Hispanic residents, out-of-compliance water
systems return to comply the standard quickly as communities have a higher capacity of civic
engagement.
This study provides a complete picture of the national inequities for safe drinking water
access, which fills the gap in the prior literature that is limited in terms of geographical scope.
The empirical findings in this study also strengthens the environmental justice demand that US
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drinking water policies should be reformed at structural level for all, free from discrimination,
bias, or inequality. It also contributes to the importance of infrastructure reparations that
particularly focuses on disadvantaged communities that were historically shaped by segregation.
Drinking water related problems, especially drinking water quality violations, extend
beyond the definition of criminal law that is a primary concept in orthodox/traditional
criminology (Lynch et al., 2018). As the U.S. Water Alliance’s report (2019) argued, this is not
an abstract concern for those who are victimized by contaminated drinking water, but an
existential, everyday threat to human healthy and rights, which may often cause more victims
and damage than street crimes (Lynch, Michalowski, and Groves, 2006; Allaire et al, 2017).
With a harm-based definition of crime, these adverse consequences caused by contaminated
drinking water deserve attention for criminological studies. Specifically, using radical
criminological lens, disproportionate impact of contaminated drinking water on vulnerable
communities is a form of social and economic injustice that is reflected by unequal distribution
of community advantage/disadvantages under the spatial organization of capitalism (Lynch,
2016). Within the context of green/state crime perspective, failure in state policies and
regulations for safe drinking water can result in the health disparities in vulnerable communities.
In addition, this study expands the environmental justice issues by examining how
community water system’s duration of SDWA noncompliance is affected by a racial/ethnic
component that has not been adequately explored in the green criminological literature. It is
expected that the finding of racial and ethnic disparities in regulatory enforcement of
environmental laws and policies in this study brings an important implication for the future green
criminology.
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Finally, rather than just focusing on who is at fault for America’s drinking water problem,
this study also emphasizes the importance of solving it at broader structural levels with diverse
stakeholders’ engagement and collaboration (such as all levels of government, utilities, nonprofit
organizations, and local communities) toward equitable and sustainable drinking water systems.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Summary of SDWA Noncompliance Model
Table A1. Descriptive Summary: SDWA Noncompliance Model (n=1,861).
Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Length of noncompliance

308.58

235.66

1.00

1185

Length of noncompliance(lg)

2.2328

.4961

.30

3.02

Proportion of Black

8.3370

12.3256

.00

81.50

Proportion of Hispanic

12.9770

17.3416

.10

99.00

Average of voting rate (2012&2016)

55.3947

8.8906

27.90

79.90

Proportion of nonprofit organization

4.0250

2.0832

.70

28.00

Ownership: private

.1006

.3074

.00

1.00

Ownership: public

.8940

.3074

.00

1.00

Utility size: small

.6005

.4898

.00

1.00

Utility size: medium

.2238

.4168

.00

1.00

Utility size: large

.1757

.3802

.00

1.00

Water source: surface

.5500

.4975

.00

1.00

Water source: ground

.4500

.4975

.00

1.00

County typology: farming

.09

.290

.00

1.00

County typology: mining

.11

.312

.00

1.00

Proportion of rural residents

48.0879

29.8252

.00

100

Metro status (1=metro)

.50

.500

.00

1.00

Population density

253.7194

816.1019

.3000

34127.00

League of Conservation Voters

30.76

25.541

.00

97

Midwest

.264

.441

.00

1.00

West

.166

.372

.00

1.00

South

.476

.499

.00

1.00

Northeast

.093

.291

.00

1.00
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Appendix B: Multicollinearity Diagnostics
Table B1. Multicollinearity Diagnostics: SDWA Violation Model.
VIF

1/VIF

Proportion of Black

2.29

.4369

Proportion of Hispanic

2.03

.4928

Proportion of Poverty

2.61

.3825

Average of voting rate (2012&2016)

1.90

.5285

Proportion of nonprofit organization

1.68

.5968

Ownership: private

1.10

.9129

Utility size: medium

1.15

.8691

Utility size: large

1.37

.7287

Water source: ground

1.20

.8333

County typology: farming

1.41

.7103

County typology: mining

1.15

.8712

Proportion of rural residents

3.33

.3003

Metro status (1=metro)

1.99

.5021

Population density

1.56

.6419

League of Conservation Voters (LCV)

2.03

.4919

Northeast

2.11

.4749

Midwest

1.83

.5474

West

1.79

.5601

Mean VIF

1.80
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Table B2. Multicollinearity Diagnostics: Noncompliance Model.
VIF

1/VIF

Proportion of Black

1.72

.5816

Proportion of Hispanic

1.93

.5177

Proportion of Poverty

2.19

.4565

Average of voting rate (2012&2016)

1.79

.5589

Proportion of nonprofit organization

1.44

.6928

Ownership: private

1.11

.9012

Utility size: medium

1.28

.8562

Utility size: large

1.17

.7789

Water source: ground

1.26

.7942

County typology: farming

1.31

.7625

County typology: mining

1.14

.8806

Proportion of rural residents

3.52

.2884

Metro status (1=metro)

1.82

.5479

Population density

1.67

.5999

League of Conservation Voters (LCV)

2.10

.4761

Northeast

1.82

.5488

Midwest

1.48

.6738

West

1.45

.6902

Mean VIF

1.68
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Appendix C: Inflated (Binary) Portion of SDWA Violation, 2016-2018
Table C1. Inflated (binary) Portion of SDWA Violation, 2016-2018
SDWA violation
% Black
% Hispanic
% Poverty
% Nonprofit org.
% Voter turnout
Size (Small omitted)
Medium
Large
Ground water (Surface omitted)
Private (Public omitted)
Farm-dependent county
Mining-dependent county
Density
% Rural residents
Rural county
Metro
LCV score
Region (South omitted)
Northeast
Midwest
West
Spatial lag: Weighted county-level violation
†<0.10 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001
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b
.012**
-.003
-.045***
-.115***
-.003

SE
.004
.003
.011
.027
.006

.095
.085
1.064***
.116
-.119
-.262†
.001***
.005*
.019
.035
.014***

.095
.117
.096
.111
.154
.144
.000
.002
.165
.099
.002

-.609*
.156
.128
-.029***

.206
.119
.136
.004

Appendix D. Kernel Density Estimate

Figure D1. Kernel Density Estimate
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